P.E.R.C. No. 2025-36, Maurice River Tp B/E

CaptionSTATE OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION In the Matter of Maurice River Township Education Association, Charging Party, -and- Docket No. CO-2024-144 Maurice River Township Board of Education, Respondent. ¶

SynopsisSYNOPSIS ¶

The Public Employment Relations Commission grants the Maurice River Township Board of Education’s motion for summary judgment and dismisses the Complaint. The Maurice River Township Education Association alleged that the Board violated the Act when it refused to include employees of the Child Study Team in the Association’s negotiations unit. The Commission finds that the Association’s charge is untimely, because it knew or should have known about the Board’s removal of certain employees from the negotiations unit within six months of when the Board provided approved individual employment contracts at open public meetings and provided a list of employee names, as well as with ordinary diligence given the size of the District. ¶

This synopsis is not part of the Commission decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commission. ¶

CaptionSTATE OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION In the Matter of Maurice River Township Education Association, Charging Party, -and- Docket No. CO-2024-144 Maurice River Township Board of Education, Respondent. ¶

AppearancesAppearances: ¶

For the Charging Party, Selikoff & Cohen, P.A., attorneys (Keith Waldman, of counsel, Liz Pudel, on the brief) ¶

For the Respondent, Comegno Law Group, P.C., attorneys (Jacob K. Mintun, of counsel) ¶

DECISION ¶

On March 19, 2024, the Maurice River Township Education Association (Association) filed an unfair practice charge (UPC) against the Maurice River Township Board of Education (Board) alleging that it violated sections 5.4a(1) and (5) of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq.1/, when it excluded newly hired Child Study Team (CST) employees directly employed by the Board in the Association’s negotiations unit. On September 5, the Director of Unfair Practices issued a Complaint on those claims. On September 13, the Board filed an Answer, denying the allegations and asserting that the appropriate unit is limited to teachers employed by the Board. ¶

On January 17, 2025, the Board filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the charge was filed outside of the statute of limitations. The Board’s motion is supported by a brief, exhibits and the certification of Patricia Powell, the Board’s Business Administrator. On February 10, the Association filed opposition, supported by a brief, exhibits, and the certifications of its Co-Presidents, Matthew Olsen and Kathleen McGlynn. Based upon the record, we find the following facts. ¶

FINDINGS OF FACT ¶

1. The Association and the Board are, respectively, a public employer and majority representative within the meaning of the Act. (Compl. ¶1-2; Ans. ¶1-2). ¶

2. The Board and Association are parties to a series of collective negotiations agreements (CNA), the most recent of which covers a period from July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2024. (Compl. ¶3; Ans. ¶3). ¶

3. Historically, the Board directly hired CST employees and at least some were included in the negotiations unit. (Compl. ¶6- 7; Ans. ¶6-7). ¶

4. For approximately 20 years, the Board did not directly employ CST employees. Instead, CST employees were contracted as part of a shared services agreement. (Compl. ¶9, Ans. ¶9). ¶

5. In 2022 and early 2023, the Board resumed employing CST employees directly when its shared service agreement ended. (Powell Cert. ¶4; Ex. A). ¶

6. This is reflected in Board meeting minutes from August, November, and December 2022, and February 2023). (Powell Cert. Ex. “B” to “E” ). ¶

8. On October 18, 2021, the Board sent the Association a current employee list in accordance with the Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.11 et seq.)2/ which included A.H. as a member of the negotiations unit, listing them as a classroom teacher. (Powell Cert. ¶1-2; Ex. F). ¶

9. The list included approximately 40 names, reflecting the small size of the school district, which consists of a single building that serves students from Kindergarten through 6th grade. (Powell Cert. Ex. F-G; Olsen and McGlynn Cert. ¶17). ¶

10. A.H. was initially hired as a CST member in August 2022 and was renewed in February 2023. (Powell Cert. Ex. B; E). ¶

11. On September 7, 2022, the Board sent a WDEA disclosure to the Association that did not include A.H.’s name, although they remained employed by the Board with the CST. (Powell Cert. ¶13- 15; Ex. G). ¶

12. The Association alleges that it became aware that a guidance counselor had been removed from the negotiations unit in October 2023. (Olsen, McGlynn Cert. ¶5). ¶

13. The Association alleges that it did not discover that A.H. was removed from the unit until October 10, 2023, when it compared the current WDEA disclosure with past disclosures. (Olsen, McGlynn Cert. ¶11). ¶

14. The Association alleges that after this discovery, it investigated whether other CST employees were included in the unit and found that the others had been excluded from WDEA disclosures as well. (Olsen, McGlynn Cert. ¶13). ¶

15. The Association filed the instant UPC on March 19, 2024. (Compl.). ¶

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶

Summary judgment will be granted if there are no material facts in dispute and the movant is entitled to relief as a matter of law. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 73-75 (1954). N.J.A.C. 19:14-4.8(e) provides: ¶

If it appears from the pleadings, together with the briefs, affidavits and other documents filed that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant or cross-movant is entitled to its requested relief as a matter of law, the motion or cross-motion for summary judgment may be granted and the requested relief may be ordered. ¶

In determining whether there exists a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary judgment, we must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 540. We “must grant all the favorable inferences to the non-movant.” Id. at 536. The summary judgment procedure is not to be used as a substitute for a plenary trial. Baer v. Sorbello, 177 N.J. Super. 183 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 388 (1981). Summary judgment “should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy.” Saldana v. DeMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488, 495 (App. Div. 1995). ¶

ARGUMENTS ¶

The Board contends that the UPC was filed outside of the six-month statute of limitations and thus should be dismissed. It avers that the “operative date” for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations is September 7, 2022, because the Association received a WDEA disclosure that was missing A.H. who was working on the CST, but had previously been a unit member. Moreover, the disclosure contained no employees on the CST. The Board further argues that the decision to directly hire CST members was made during open Board meetings and the approval of CST members’ individual employment contracts was reflected in public meeting minutes. In the Board’s view, both of these actions served as notice to the Association that it did not consider CST employees part of the negotiations unit. ¶

The Association argues that the UPC was filed within the statute of limitations, with an operative date of October 10, 2023. It alleges that the Association was unaware that the Board was hiring CST members outside of the unit until A.H. was moved out of the unit. The Association disputes that the earlier WDEA disclosure or the Board minutes provided sufficient notice to the Association, and therefore an earlier operative date should be applied. Alternatively, the Association argues that the Board’s alleged deceptive conduct-specifically, removing a name from the WDEA disclosure instead of giving clear notice to the Association creates a factual dispute. This, it claims, necessitates a hearing to determine whether the statute of limitations should be tolled on equitable grounds. ¶

ANALYSIS ¶

N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4c entrusts exclusive primary jurisdiction to the Commission for the adjudication of unfair practice claims, “provided that no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day he was no longer so prevented.” Since only the Association has standing to assert that a public employer violated section 5.4a(5)3/, the question is whether agents of the Association filed the instant charge in a timely manner. We find that the Association “should have known” of the potential unfair practice more than six months before its filing, making it untimely. Thus, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. ¶

In State of NJ (Juvenile Justice), P.E.R.C. No. 2014-71, 40 NJPER 512 (¶164 2014), as affirmed by (App. Div. 2017), we summarized the relevant considerations in determining whether a UPC was timely filed, or in what circumstances, a charge may be filed after six months: ¶

The Act does not rigidly bar relief on all causes of action arising more than six months before a charge was filed. A charge may still be filed if the charging party was “prevented” from filing a charge on time and the six month period will not begin to run until the charging party was “no longer so prevented.” In determining whether a party was “prevented” from filing an earlier charge, the Commission must conscientiously consider the circumstances of each case and assess the Legislature’s objectives in prescribing the time limits as to a particular claim. The word “prevent” ordinarily connotes factors beyond a complainant’s control disabling him or her from filing a timely charge, but it includes all relevant considerations bearing upon the fairness of imposing the statute of limitations. Relevant considerations include whether a charging party sought timely relief in another forum; whether the respondent fraudulently concealed and misrepresented the facts establishing an unfair practice; when a charging party knew or should have known the basis for its claim; and how long a time has passed between the contested action and the charge. ¶

(citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added). ¶

Although it is undisputed that the Board never directly informed the Association that it was excluding directly hired CST employees from the Association’s negotiations unit, there is no evidence in the record to suggest the Board concealed its activities. The Board approved individual employment contracts at open Board meetings, which were recorded in public meeting minutes. The Board also provided WDEA disclosures that did not include CST employees after the expiration of the CST shared services agreement, including the conspicuous removal of A.H. from that list. Further, it is undisputed that this is a small district, encompassing a single school building that houses both the CST offices and regular classrooms. Given the District’s size, it is reasonable to expect that Association leadership should have an awareness of the scope of its membership using ordinary diligence. We decline to accept the Association’s claim that “it is very easy to become secluded in your own classroom and not know what goes on beyond the room next door” as a valid reason for tolling the statute of limitations. (Olsen and McGlynn Cert. ¶17). ¶

We find that the operative date for statute of limitations purposes is September 7, 2022, the date of the WDEA disclosure lacking A.H.’s name. Since the instant UPC was filed March 19, 2024, more than six months after the operative date, it is untimely. The complaint is dismissed.4/ ¶

OrderORDER ¶

Maurice River Township Board of Education’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The Complaint is dismissed. ¶

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION ¶

Chair Hennessy-Shotter, Commissioners Eaton, Ford, Kushnir, and Papero voted in favor of this decision. None opposed. Commissioner Higgins was not present. ¶

ISSUED: March 27, 2025 ¶

Trenton, New Jersey ¶

Note1/ These provisions prohibit public employers, their representatives or agents from: “(1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act. . . .(5) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employees in that unit, or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative.” ¶

2/ N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.12(c) provides that: “...Every 120 calendar days beginning on January 1, [2019], public employers shall provide exclusive representative employee organizations, in an Excel file or similar format agreed to by the employee organization, the following information for all negotiations unit employees: name, job title, worksite location, home address, work, home and personal cellular telephone numbers, date of hire, and work email address and personal email address on file with the public employer.” ¶

3/ See, generally, N.J. Turnpike Auth. (App. Div. 1981), aff’ g P.E.R.C. No. 81-64, 6 NJPER 560 (¶11284 1980). ¶

4/ We note that no related clarification of unit petition was filed in this matter. See N.J.A.C. 19:11-1.5. Such a petition, if meritorious, could result in an order recognizing the inclusion of employees in the negotiations unit if they perform negotiations unit work or otherwise should be included. N.J.A.C. 19:11-1.5(b)3. ¶