P.E.R.C. No. 2026-31, Camden

CaptionSTATE OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION In the Matter of CITY OF CAMDEN, Respondent, -and- Docket No. CO-2025-118 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2578, Charging Party. ¶

SynopsisSYNOPSIS ¶

The Public Employment Relations Commission sustains the refusal of the Director of Unfair Practices to issue a complaint on an unfair practice charge filed by the IAFF against the City. The charge alleges that the City violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1, et seq., by refusing to sign a settlement agreement after settling a disciplinary grievance with the IAFF just prior to the grievance arbitration hearing. The Commission finds that, as the record demonstrates that the City’s counsel notified the IAFF’s counsel that he needed his client to approve of the settlement, the City’s counsel did not have actual or apparent authority to bind the City to a settlement agreement. The Commission therefore holds that the City did not violate the Act by refusing to sign the IAFF’s draft agreement. ¶

This synopsis is not part of the Commission decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commission. ¶

CaptionSTATE OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION In the Matter of CITY OF CAMDEN, Respondent, -and- Docket No. CO-2025-118 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2578, Charging Party. ¶

AppearancesAppearances: ¶

For the Respondent, Brown & Connery, LLP (Michael J. DiPiero, of counsel) ¶

For the Charging Party, Michael A. Bukosky & Associates, LLC (Michael A. Bukosky, of counsel) ¶

DECISION ¶

On October 14, 2025, the International Association of Firefighters, Local 2578 (IAFF) appealed from the October 2 decision of the Director of Unfair Practices (Director) refusing to issue a complaint on its unfair practice charge (UPC). D.U.P. No. 2026-4, 52 NJPER 115 (¶30 2025). The UPC, filed on January 17, 2025 and amended on January 23, alleged that the City of Camden (City) violated subsections 5.4a(1), (5), and (6)1/ of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1, et seq., when it refused to sign a settlement agreement after settling a disciplinary grievance with the IAFF just prior to the grievance arbitration hearing. ¶

On February 18, 2025, the City filed a position statement asserting that there were settlement negotiations and that the arbitration “hearing was canceled on the basis that each party’s counsel could try and craft a settlement agreement” but that an agreement was never reached on the final terms of the settlement. (IAFF Appendix 17a-19a). On April 14, the IAFF filed a responsive position statement asserting that a settlement agreement was reached that justified the cancellation of the hearing and that the City’s counsel did not assert at the time that there were qualifying conditions such as further approval by a City official. (IAFF Appendix 10a-13a). ¶

The IAFF’s responsive position statement attached an exhibit showing the e-mail exchange between counsel for the parties and the grievance arbitrator on June 5, 2024 when the arbitration hearing was canceled. The email from the IAFF’s counsel to the arbitrator, the City’s counsel, and others, stated: ¶

Arbitrator [Name], I believe we have a settlement in this matter. Accordingly, the parties have agreed to split the cancellation fee and the hearing can be cancelled. Thank you again for your help. Please confirm that you have received this notice. Thank you, Mike. ¶

[June 5, 2024 4:24 pm IAFF counsel email.] ¶

The response email from the City’s counsel stated: “That is accurate. Thank you.” (June 5, 2024 4:34 pm DiPiero email). Although the IAFF asserts that the “essential terms of the settlement agreement were then agreed to,” it concedes that “[c]ounsel agreed that the mechanics of the agreement would be fleshed out in a settlement document.” (IAFF Brief at 3). ¶

The City’s position statement explained the dispute between the parties concerning the details of the settlement agreement as follows: ¶

At this point, the driver had already been adjudicated for discipline and both sides were trying to come up with a settlement that would resolve this matter without a hearing. The City made an initial offer which was the penalty imposed on the driver. However, the Union made a counter offer to divide the time between suspension and a paid leave fine. ¶

[February 18, 2025 City Position Statement.] ¶

A draft Settlement Agreement signed by the employee and the IAFF on June 12, 2024, but not signed by the City, included a penalty split between a suspension and a fine. ¶

On July 18, 2025, at the request of the Director, the City’s counsel submitted a certification to the Commission Staff Agent and the IAFF’s counsel. (D.U.P. No. 2026-4 at 2). The certification stated, in pertinent part: ¶

On June 5, 2025, some draft settlement language was circulated to me by [IAFF counsel]. I advised [IAFF counsel] by email that I had some suggested changes to the draft language and indicated that I needed to get the client to sign off on the settlement. The Parties agreed to cancel the hearing and split the cost of the arbitrator’s late cancellation fee. ¶

[City counsel Cert.; emphasis added] ¶

Relying on the City counsel’s Certification, the Director found the following facts: ¶

On or about June 5, 2024, some draft settlement language was sent from IAFF’s attorney to outside labor counsel (counsel) for the City. Counsel for the City then advised of some suggested changes to the draft settlement language and advised that his client would need to sign off on the agreement. The parties agreed to cancel the arbitration hearing and split the cost of the arbitrator’s late cancellation fee. ¶

[D.U.P. No. 2026-4 at 3; emphasis added.] ¶

The IAFF’s brief in this appeal disputes the above-emphasized finding, stating: ¶

This statement is not true. There was never any requirement that the “client” would need to sign the agreement and there was never any evidence of such a qualifying condition. A settlement was reached - a signature on behalf of any employer representative would only memorialize [] what had already been agreed to. At no time did the representative for the City indicate that the settlement was subject to ratification by any person or any body. At no time when the essential details of the settlement were reached did Counsel for the City indicate he did not have authority to settle or that he needed additional approval or ratification by the governing body. ¶

[IAFF Brief at 2-3.] ¶

However, the IAFF’s counsel never submitted a certification or other documents to refute the City counsel’s certified statements indicating that he had notified the IAFF’s counsel of suggested changes and the need for approval from his client. ¶

On November 20, 2024, the IAFF’s counsel followed up with the City’s counsel demanding that the City enter into the settlement they agreed to. On November 25, the City’s counsel advised the IAFF’s counsel that “the draft agreement was rejected by the City” and that he would be seeking a new date for the arbitration. (City counsel Cert.). The IAFF subsequently filed its UPC challenging the City’s refusal to sign the settlement agreement after the parties canceled the arbitration hearing. ¶

Analysis ¶

N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 provides, in pertinent part: ¶

In addition, the majority representative and designated representatives of the public employer shall meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith with respect to grievances, disciplinary disputes, and other terms and conditions of employment. Nothing herein shall be construed as permitting negotiation of the standards or criteria for employee performance. ¶

When an agreement is reached on the terms and conditions of employment, it shall be embodied in writing and signed by the authorized representatives of the public employer and the majority representative. ¶

[Emphases supplied.] ¶

N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(5) makes it an unfair practice for an employer, its representatives, or agents not to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(6) makes it an unfair practice for an employer, its representatives, or agents to refuse “to reduce a negotiated agreement to writing and to sign such agreement.” ¶

The dispute in this case concerns the negotiations between the parties’ counsels to settle a disciplinary grievance prior to the arbitration hearing. Although the parties represented to the arbitrator on June 5, 2024 that they “believe we have a settlement in this matter,” they both have acknowledged that either the “mechanics” or details of the settlement agreement still remained to be negotiated. However, regardless of the extent to which the parties’ counsels agreed to settlement terms prior to cancelling the arbitration hearing, the record indicates that the City’s counsel did not have the authority to bind the City to a settlement agreement. ¶

“Generally, an agent may only bind his principal for such acts that are within his actual or apparent authority.” New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 203 N.J. 208, 220 (2010) (internal quotes omitted). “Actual authority occurs ‘when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.’” Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency: Actual Authority § 2.01). “[A]pparent authority arises when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Bridgewater-Raritan Sch. Dist., Somerset Cnty., 221 N.J. 349, 363 (2015) (internal quotes omitted). ¶

Here, the City’s counsel certified that he notified the IAFF’s counsel that he needed his client to “sign off on the settlement.” (City counsel Cert.) Based on that statement, the IAFF’s counsel could not reasonably believe that the City’s counsel had the actual or apparent authority to act on behalf of the City to bind it to a settlement agreement. After receiving a copy of the City counsel’s certification on July 18, 2025, the IAFF’s counsel submitted no certification or other evidence to refute the City counsel’s statement that he had advised him about the need for the City’s approval of the settlement. ¶

As its counsel effectively disclaimed final settlement authority by reserving the agreement for the City’s approval, we find that the City did not violate the Act by refusing to sign the IAFF’s draft settlement agreement. See Washington Tp. Bd. of Ed., P.E.R.C. No. 2011-32, 36 NJPER 401 (¶155 2010) ( “Although the Act authorizes public employers and public employee organizations to negotiate through designated representatives, limits on the authority of those representatives are often established by the ground rules for negotiations.” ). While it is unfortunate that the parties’ inability to finalize a settlement agreement has resulted in the additional arbitration costs, the IAFF’s attempt at settling this matter did not deprive it of its opportunity to continue pursuing it through binding arbitration. ¶

Although the City's Counsel advised the IAFF that he did not have authority to ratify the draft settlement agreement, the Director, relying on Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass’n, 221 N.J. 349, supra, found that even without that advisement, he could not have bound the City because the doctrine of apparent authority does not apply to governmental actors. (D.U.P. at 6). We disagree.2/ However, since the City’s counsel notified the IAFF’s counsel of his need for further approval on the proposed grievance settlement terms, the application of apparent authority was not at issue in this dispute. ¶

OrderORDER ¶

The unfair practice charge is dismissed. ¶

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION ¶

Chair Hennessy-Shotter, Commissioners Davey, Eaton, Higgins, and Papero voted in favor of this decision. None opposed. Commissioner Hines recused himself. ¶

ISSUED: March 26, 2026 ¶

Trenton, New Jersey ¶

Note1/ These provisions prohibit public employers, their representatives or agents from: “(1)Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act; (5) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with the majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms or conditions of employment of employees in that unit, or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative; and (6) Refusing to reduce a negotiated agreement to writing and to sign such an agreement.” ¶

2/ Bridgewater-Raritan involved replacement teachers who relied on the representations of a school administrator regarding their ability to gain tenure, which under applicable school laws was only within the school board’s authority to grant. 221 N.J. at 358-365. By contrast, in a labor relations context, the Act contemplates the parties using “designated representatives” to “negotiate in good faith with respect to grievances, disciplinary disputes, and other terms and conditions of employment.” N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. ¶