P.E.R.C. No. 2026-37, Trenton

CaptionSTATE OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION In the Matter of CITY OF TRENTON, Respondent, -and- Docket No. CO-2026-118 PBA LOCAL 11A, SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (SOA), Charging Party. ¶

SynopsisSYNOPSIS ¶

The Commission denies PBA Local 11A (SOA)’s motion for reconsideration seeking interim relief (IR), dismisses its charge alleging a refusal to negotiate in good faith, and remands for complaint issuance and further processing of its claim alleging interference with statutory rights, in the SOA’s unfair practice charge (UPC) against the City of Trenton. The UPC alleges the City violated the Act when its Police Director sent an email accusing the SOA President of extortion and other unlawful/improper activity during negotiations. The IR application sought a retraction of the email pending final disposition of the UPC. The Commission sustains the denial of IR, finding the SOA did not establish irreparable harm where the requested retraction may be ordered as part of an overall remedy at the conclusion of the proceeding, and there is recourse for appeal of discipline imposed for protected activity resulting from any express or implied threat contained within the email. However, the Commission finds further processing of the interference charge is required to determine whether the Police Director’s accusations lacked a legitimate and substantial business justification. Finally, the Commission finds no basis for complaint issuance on the alleged refusal to negotiate because the email contains no such explicit refusal nor any assertion by the Police Director that the matters under discussion were not negotiable. ¶

This synopsis is not part of the Commission decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commission. ¶

CaptionSTATE OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION In the Matter of CITY OF TRENTON, Respondent, -and- Docket No. CO-2026-118 PBA LOCAL 11A, SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (SOA), Charging Party. ¶

AppearancesAppearances: ¶

For the Respondent, Wes Bridges (Law Director, City of Trenton) ¶

For the Charging Party, Alterman & Associates, attorneys (Stuart Alterman, Esq., of counsel) ¶

DECISION ¶

On January 30, 2026, PBA Local 11A (SOA) filed a motion for reconsideration of a decision issued on January 14 by the Director of Unfair Practices (Director), denying the PBA’s request for interim relief (IR) on its unfair practice charge (UPC) against the City of Trenton (City). ¶

As filed on December 30, 2025, together with its IR request, the PBA’s UPC alleges the City violated sections 5.4a(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq.1/, when its Police Director sent an email accusing SOA President J.W. of extortion and other unlawful/improper activity. The IR application primarily sought an order directing the retraction of the email pending final disposition of the UPC. It was supported by a brief, exhibits, and the certification of President J.W. The City filed no opposition. ¶

The Director declined to issue an order to show cause on the IR application, finding the SOA had not shown “clear and convincing” evidence demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its section 5.4a(1) claim or that it suffered irreparable harm from Wilson’s email. The Director further found the SOA had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on its 5.4a(3),(4), and (5) claims. The Director ordered further processing of the UPC in accordance with Commission rules and regulations. ¶

On January 15, 2026, the Director issued a “defect letter” to the SOA. The defect letter stated that based upon the Director’s reasons for denying IR he was inclined to dismiss the SOA’s charge in its entirety, unless it filed a formal amendment to the UPC and/or a legal brief setting forth additional facts and/or legal argument responsive to the Director’s concerns. ¶

The SOA requested and received an extension of time to file a response to the defect letter, which included an amended UPC and additional certifications and was filed on January 30, 2026, together with its motion for reconsideration. We will consider those items as part of the motion record. ¶

As amended, the UPC states that on the present record the SOA does not seek complaint issuance on its 5.4a(3) and (4) claims while reserving the right to do so via subsequent amendment. (Id.) Accordingly, the 5.4a(3) and (4) claims are deemed withdrawn without prejudice. This decision will address only the SOA’s amended 5.4a(1) and (5) claims: ¶

N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(1) ¶

(interference/coercion): ¶

an official written accusation of criminality/illegality/moral turpitude against the union's designee and President, disseminated to counsel, the City Law Director, and a subordinate unit member (Captain [J.S.]), which objectively tends to interfere with protected rights and lacks any legitimate and substantial business justification; ¶

N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(5) ¶

(refusal to negotiate/repudiation): ¶

after an admitted verbal demand to negotiate over stipends/differentials and related successor terms, the City refused to bargain and contaminated the bargaining channel by criminalizing protected negotiations and bypassing lawful labor processes (including scope mechanisms). ¶

In support of its motion for reconsideration and its response to the defect letter, the SOA filed a brief, exhibits, the supplemental certification of President J.W., and the certification of Captain J.S., an SOA member who serves as the Police Director’s Chief of Staff. The Commission received no responsive filing from the City. These facts appear. ¶

J.W. certifies that the parties are in negotiations for a successor to their most recent collective negotiations agreement (CNA) governing superior officers’ terms and conditions of employment that expired on December 31, 2023. That CNA includes a 4% compensation differential commonly referred to, J.W. certifies, as “detective pay” or the “detective differential.” He further certifies that this differential has been applied in practice to certain atypical investigative or confidential assignments, where the assignment is not a traditional case- carrying “detective” role. ¶

J.W. certifies that in October of 2024 the SOA submitted a written contract proposal to the City’s negotiator, its Business Administrator, that included a 4% stipend for the SOA President, in lieu of a detective differential. In 2025, J.W. pursued “administrative discussions” with various City representatives (including the Mayor, the Mayor’s Chief of Staff, and the Business Administrator) about the proposed SOA President stipend as well as a separate proposal for a stipend for the title of Public Information Officer (PIO), which was also based on “the existing detective differential framework.” J.W. certifies that he followed up on these discussions relating to the stipend proposals with supporting documentation sent by email to the Business Administrator on November 6, 2025. ¶

The Police Director’s email that is the subject of this dispute recounts a meeting that took place in his office on November 7, 2025, when J.W. arrived, according to the email, “to have a conversation” about “the contract situation between the city and the unions (PBA & SOA)” . Dated November 13, the email was sent to legal counsel for both the SOA and the City as well as to President J.W. and Captain J.S., among others. It states that the Police Director’s Chief of Staff, J.S., was also initially present at the meeting until J.W. asked to speak privately with the Police Director, whereupon J.S. exited the room. The charge focuses on allegations in the email about a conversation between the Police Director and J.W., after J.S. left. The email states, in pertinent part (emphases added): ¶

President [J.W.] then advised me that he felt I should give him detective pay and expressed the reasons why. I initially scoffed at the idea but agreed I would hear him out. I advised him that detective pay was only given because one was doing detective work or one was assigned to the Director’s Office. He didn’t agree, offering different reasons that are outside of the contract or past practice for awarding detective pay. President [J.W.] then offered up that he would drop the upcoming unfair labor practice grievance[2/] in exchange for detective pay. This is textbook Quid Pro Quo, which is immoral, unethical and illegal. I couldn’t believe what I was hearing to say the least. During the course of the conversation, he mentioned that he had spoken to the Mayor and . . . the [Mayor’s] Chief of Staff on the reasons why he felt he should get detective pay. He didn’t elaborate as to their response. The conversation ended and President [J.W.] exited . . . . I immediately advised Captain [J.S.] of the conversation as I couldn’t believe what was just offered and wanted to confirm what I was thinking. Captain [J.S.] agreed that the offer put by President was Quid Pro Quo or at least not ethical on its face. On Monday, November 10, 2025, I advised [the Mayor’s] Chief of Staff . . . of President [J.W.’s] offer to not file the unfair labor practice grievance in exchange for detective pay. ¶

As I am not willing to engage in Quid Pro Quo and I believe that President [J.W.] knew that when he left my office on Friday. Can I assume that this is the unfair labor practice for which he was trying to solicit unearned detective pay? ¶

J.W. certifies that during the private conversation (which he expected to remain private unless mutually agreed otherwise) J.W. explained to the Police Director that the proposed stipends were proper subjects for negotiations “and/or settlement agreements” because they involved terms and conditions of employment. J.W. also referenced other pending disputes between the parties (see n.2, supra) as to which the Commission had encouraged settlement.3/ ¶

J.W. further certifies that the Police Director did not state that the subject was “off limits” or that the bargaining proposal was “illegal,” and did not otherwise accuse J.W. of criminal conduct during the November 7 meeting, which ended with no indication that the Police Director would later do so via email. J.W. certifies that, given the Police Director’s position and authority, he understood the email as a warning that he would be accused of criminal or unethical conduct if he raised these subjects in bargaining or in meetings with City representatives. J.W. saw this as an attempt to interfere with and constrain the bargaining process, which chilled him from continuing to raise these subjects with the City. ¶

J.W. further certifies that such a written accusation by the Police Director against a law-enforcement supervisor and union president creates immediate professional jeopardy for the accused, including credibility implications and the foreseeable risk that it will be referred for disciplinary action, even if no discipline has yet been imposed. J.W. certifies that he lacks personal knowledge of whether the Police Director or any City official has made any referral to a prosecutor regarding the allegations in the Police Director’s November 13 email. ¶

J.S. certifies that he is a Captain in the Trenton Police Department currently serving as the Police Director’s Chief of Staff, and he is also a dues-paying SOA member. J.S. further certifies: he was not present and did not witness or overhear any portion of the private conversation at issue; he did not independently verify the actual context of President J.W.’s settlement proposal; and his knowledge of that exchange is limited to what the Police Director told him after the fact. ¶

J.S. also certifies that as a sworn Police Captain he has a duty under the New Jersey Attorney General’s Guidelines and Department policy to report, investigate, or log credible allegations of criminal conduct or official misconduct. He certifies that upon receipt of the Police Director’s November 13 email he did not initiate an official inquiry, Internal Affairs report, or criminal referral regarding President J.W. Based upon his assessment of available information as well as his training, experience, and knowledge of the parties’ roles, J.S. saw the Police Director’s email as characterizing a labor dispute, not a credible report of criminal activity. Specifically, due to J.W.’s legal standing as SOA President, J.S. did not interpret the stipend proposal as a criminal act of “extortion” or “illegal solicitation” that would require law enforcement intervention. ¶

Analysis ¶

Motion for Reconsideration of IR Denial ¶

Motions for reconsideration of interim relief decisions are governed by N.J.A.C. 19:14-9.6, which states, in pertinent part: ¶

Reconsideration will only be granted based on a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances and exceptional importance. The movant shall specify and bear the burden of establishing the grounds warranting reconsideration. . . . The filing and pendency of a motion for reconsideration shall not operate to stay the effectiveness of the Commission’s designee’s interim relief decision unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. ¶

Only in cases of exceptional importance will we intrude into the regular interim relief process by granting a motion for reconsideration by the full Commission. City of Passaic, P.E.R.C. No. 2004-50, 30 NJPER 67 (&21 2004); Borough of Closter, P.E.R.C. No. 2001-75, 27 NJPER 289 (&32104 2001). Interim relief is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only in limited circumstances where appropriate and necessary. State of New Jersey, P.E.R.C. No. 76-6, 1 NJPER 41 (1975). ¶

To obtain interim relief, the moving party must demonstrate that it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing in a final Commission decision on its legal and factual allegations and that irreparable harm will occur if the requested relief is not granted. Further, the public interest must not be injured by an interim relief order and the relative hardship to the parties in granting or denying relief must be considered. Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-134 (1982); State of New Jersey (Stockton State College), P.E.R.C. No. 76-6, 1 NJPER 41 (1975); Little Egg Harbor Tp., P.E.R.C. No. 94, 1 NJPER 37 (1975). A party seeking such relief “has the burden to prove each of the Crowe factors by clear and convincing evidence.” Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013)(emphasis added); Essex Cty., P.E.R.C. No. 2005-56, 31 NJPER 103, 106 and n.2 (P45 2005)(all elements of Crowe test must be present). ¶

Applying the above standards to the record presented, we deny the SOA’s motion for reconsideration. We sustain the denial of interim relief because we agree with the Director that the SOA has not established that it will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Harm becomes irreparable in circumstances where the Commission cannot fashion an adequate remedy which would return the parties to the conditions that existed before the occurrence of any unfair practice at the conclusion of the processing of the unfair practice charge. Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, P.E.R.C. No. 2020-60, 47 NJPER 32 (¶6 2020) (citing, City of Newark, I.R. No. 2006-3, 31 NJPER 250 (¶97 2005); Atlantic City Bd. of Ed., I.R. No. 2003-14, 29 NJPER 305 (¶94 2003); and Sussex Cty., I.R. No. 2003-13, 29 NJPER 274 (¶81 2003)). ¶

The interim relief sought by the SOA is a retraction of the Police Director’s November 13 email pending the outcome of the UPC. If it is determined at the conclusion of the processing of the UPC that the email violated the Act, such a retraction may be ordered as part of the overall remedy, thus returning the parties to conditions that existed before the commission of the unfair practice. ¶

Further, even assuming (without deciding) that the Police Director’s email contains an express or implied threat of discipline for protected activity, the imposition of such discipline would not constitute irreparable harm where there is recourse for appeal of that discipline. See, City of Trenton, I.R. No. 2005-7, 31 NJPER 28 (¶13 2005)(denying IR where “no discipline had been imposed” on PBA president, “he was still working and available to represent” employees, and “a sophisticated [Civil Service] appeal procedure” existed to decide the legitimacy of then-preliminary disciplinary charges that were allegedly in retaliation for protected activity). See also, Bergen Community College, I.R. No. 2008-10, 34 NJPER 58 (¶22 2008) (threat or imposition of discipline does not constitute irreparable harm); State of New Jersey, I.R. No. 2007-14, 33 NJPER 138 (¶49 2007)(same), recon. granted on other grounds, P.E.R.C. No. 2008-12, 33 NJPER 225 (¶85 2007); Allentown Bor., I.R. No. 2001-14, 27 NJPER 264 (¶32094 2001)(same); Sayreville Bor., I.R. No. 93-14, 19 NJPER 166 (¶24083 1993)(same). Here, such disciplinary appeal procedures are available to the SOA, through either the parties’ negotiated grievance procedure (minor discipline) or the Civil Service (major discipline), as the City of Trenton is a Civil Service municipality. Trenton City Code, Art. III, § 2-8(A)(1). ¶

Pleading Defects ¶

For purposes of administrative efficiency, we will also consider whether the SOA’s response to the Director’s January 15 letter has cured any pleading defects. N.J.A.C. 19:14-2.1(a) sets forth the Commission’s unfair practice complaint issuance standard, in pertinent part as follows: ¶

[I]f it appears to the Director of Unfair Practices that the allegations of the charge, if true, may constitute unfair practices on the part of the respondent, and that formal proceedings should be instituted in order to afford the parties an opportunity to litigate relevant legal and factual issues, the Director shall issue and serve a formal complaint. ¶

[N.J.A.C. 19:14-2.1(a) (emphasis added).] ¶

Our rules also provide that before a complaint issues, the Director “may permit the charging party to amend a charge upon such terms as may be deemed just.” N.J.A.C. 19:14-1.5(a). ¶

The SOA responded to the defect letter with an amended UPC that (on the present record) does not seek complaint issuance on the section 5.4a(3) and 5.4a(4) claims set forth in its initial charge. The SOA also provided additional facts and legal argument. As further explained below, we find the SOA has satisfied the complaint issuance standard as to its section 5.4a(1) claims, but not its 5.4a(5) claim. ¶

The 5.4a(1) Claim ¶

An employer independently violates section 5.4a(1) if its action tends to interfere with an employee’s statutory rights and lacks a legitimate and substantial business justification. Somerville Bd. of Ed., D.U.P. No. 2024-18, 51 NJPER 59, 60 (¶15 2024); N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., P.E.R.C. No. 80-73, 5 NJPER 550, n.1 (¶10285 1979)). Proof of actual interference, intimidation, restraint, coercion, or motive is unnecessary; the objective tendency to interfere is sufficient. Id. (citing, Commercial Tp. Bd. of Ed., P.E.R.C. No. 83-25, 8 NJPER 550 (¶13253 1982), aff’d (App. Div. 1983); City of Hackensack, P.E.R.C. No. 78-71, 4 NJPER 190 (¶4096 1978), aff’d (App. Div. 1979)). A violation of another unfair practice provision derivatively violates subsection 5.4a(1). See, e.g., Lakehurst Bd. of Ed., P.E.R.C. No. 2004-74, 30 NJPER 186 (¶69 2004), aff’d (App. Div. 2005). ¶

Section 5.4a(1) cases require a balancing of two important but conflicting rights: the employer’s right of free speech and the employees’ rights to be free from coercion, restraint or interference in the exercise of protected rights. State of N.J. (Trenton State Coll.), P.E.R.C. No. 88-19, 13 NJPER 720 (¶18269 1987). In striking that balance, all circumstances of a particular case must be reviewed. Id. An employer has the right to criticize an employee representative as long as the employer’s actions do not rise to the level of unlawful interference with protected rights. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Ed., P.E.R.C. No. 82-19, 7 NJPER 502 (¶12223 1981). “Unflattering descriptions, although unfortunate, are sometimes part of both the work and the labor relations environment. They are not, however, necessarily illegal.” Lakehurst Bd. of Ed., P.E.R.C. No. 2004-74, 30 NJPER 186 (¶69 2004), aff’d 31 NJPER 290 (¶113 App. Div. 2005). ¶

The City, having filed no response to the SOA’s IR application, its motion for reconsideration, or its response to the defect letter, did not place into the record a legitimate and substantial business justification for the accusatory statements in the Police Director’s November 13 email. Nor has the City disputed the SOA’s certified statements. These include the SOA President’s view that given his position of authority the Police Director’s accusation of illegal and unethical conduct created professional jeopardy for J.W. as a law enforcement officer and the foreseeable risk of referral for disciplinary action; and Captain J.S.’s certified opinion that the Police Director’s accusations against J.W. did not warrant an official inquiry, Internal Affairs report, or criminal referral. ¶

Further, there is no claim or evidence that J.W. was not acting in his official capacity as SOA President during the November 7 meeting, or that the matters under discussion in that meeting did not concern negotiations over negotiable terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Hamilton Tp. Bd. of Ed., D.U.P. No. 82-24, 8 NJPER 199 (¶13083 1982) (refusing to issue complaint on unit members’ charge that association violated its duty of fair representation when it negotiated multi-year contract which required withdrawal of certain unfair practice charges in exchange for certain employer concessions). ¶

Although the Police Director evidently holds a civilian position, the City’s Administrative Code makes him “directly responsible for the efficient and routine day-to-day operations of the Police Department” , with authority to “[a]dopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the government of the divisions under his/her supervision and for the discipline of their members.” Trenton City Code, Art. XII, § 2-57(C)(emphasis added). In light of this significant authority, including over police disciplinary matters, we find that the allegations in the SOA’s amended charge, if true, may constitute unfair practices on the part of the respondent, supporting the issuance of a complaint under 5.4a(1). That is, further processing of the charge is required to determine whether the Police Director’s accusations of illegal and unethical conduct against the SOA President lacked any legitimate and substantial business justification. ¶

The 5.4a(5) Claim ¶

The Commission’s standard for determining whether a party has refused to negotiate in good faith in violation of Section 5.4a(5) of the Act is as follows: ¶

It is necessary to subjectively analyze the totality of the parties’ conduct in order to determine whether an illegal refusal to negotiate may have occurred. A determination that a party has refused to negotiate in good faith will depend upon an analysis of the overall conduct and/or attitude of the party charged. The object of this analysis is to determine the intent of the respondent, i.e., whether the respondent brought to the negotiating table an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement, as opposed to a predetermined intention to go through the motions, seeking to avoid, rather than reach, an agreement. ¶

[State of New Jersey, 1 NJPER 39, 40 (1975), aff’d 141 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1976).] ¶

Applying that standard here, we find the Police Director’s email does not evidence a refusal to negotiate requiring the issuance of a complaint under 5.4a(5). While further processing of the charge is warranted under 5.4a(1) as detailed supra, the email contains no explicit refusal to negotiate nor, as the SOA admits, any assertion by the Police Director to the effect that the matters under discussion are not negotiable. ¶

The SOA’s certifications do not refute or take specific issue with the email’s statements that the Police Director agreed to “hear out” J.W. regarding the proposed stipend for the SOA President and expressing the Police Director’s view that “detective pay was only given because one was doing detective work or one was assigned to the Director’s Office.” The email further contains the Police Director’s opinion that the reasons offered by J.W in support of the stipend “are outside of the contract or past practice for awarding detective pay.” Overall, we find that while these statements indicate the parties had differing viewpoints about the proposal, they are not inconsistent with good-faith negotiations and do not evince a “predetermined intention to go through the motions” or avoid, rather than reach, an agreement. ¶

OrderORDER ¶

Based upon the foregoing, SOA’s motion for reconsideration is denied, its 5.4a(5) charge is dismissed, and the matter is remanded to the Director for complaint issuance and further processing of its 5.4a(1) claim. ¶

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION ¶

Chair Hennessy-Shotter, Commissioners Davey, Eaton, Higgins, and Hines voted in favor of this decision. None opposed. Commissioner Papero recused himself. ¶

ISSUED: April 23, 2026 ¶

Trenton, New Jersey ¶

Note1/ These provisions prohibit public employers, their representatives or agents from: “(1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act; (3) Discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act; (4) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee because he has signed or filed an affidavit, petition or complaint or given any information or testimony under this act; and (5) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employees in that unit, or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative.” ¶

2/ The email does not contain a docket number associated with the “unfair labor practice grievance” that J.W. allegedly offered to “drop” in exchange for detective pay. When it filed its UPC in this matter, the SOA identified two other pending UPCs that are “based upon the same facts alleged in the charge or are otherwise related” : CO-2023-114 and CO- 2023-124. To date, both appear in the Commission’s case management system as active cases, each with proposed hearing dates. ¶

3/ J.W. certifies he did not mention or propose to waive or withdraw another matter (CO-2026-086) during his November 7 meeting with the Police Director, as that UPC had not yet been filed. ¶