Stephen Hedberg, CSC Docket No. 2020-2082
NJ Civil Service Commission decision of July 23, 2025, CSC Docket No. 2020-2082: discipline, penalty upheld. Stephen Hedberg, Police Officer, Perth Amboy, Police Department, 20 working day suspension, on charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee.
Commission decisions · Meeting of July 23, 2025
Stephen Hedberg, Police Officer, Perth Amboy, Police Department, 20 working day suspension, on charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee.
- Matter
- Discipline
- Decided
- July 23, 2025, item A-3
- Outcome
- Penalty upheld
- ALJ's recommendation
- Modify the 20 working day suspension to a 10 working day suspension.
- Penalty appealed
- 20 working day suspension
- Title
- POLICE OFFICER
- Employer
- Perth Amboy
- Chair at the time
- Allison Chris Myers, Acting Chairperson
- Official decision
- CSC's PDF
Action recorded in the minutes: The Civil Service Commission upheld the 20 working day suspension.
The decision
CSC published this decision as a scanned image. The text below was recognized by OCR, read twice and checked against the meeting minutes, but OCR can misread a word. The official document is the record.
BackgroundThe appeal of Stephen Hedberg, Police Officer, Perth Amboy, Police Department, 20 working day suspension, on charges, was before by Administrative Law Judge William T. Cooper, IIT (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on June 13, 2025. No exceptions were filed.
AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALu’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on July 23, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s findings of facts but did not adopt his recommendation to modify the 20 working day suspension to a 10 working day suspension. Rather, the Commission upheld the 20 working day suspension.
The only real issue in this matter is the penalty to be imposed. In his initial decision, the ALJ found:
An analysis of the mitigating and aggravating factors must be undertaken before the appropriate discipline can be determined. The mitigating factors are as follows: First, on May 20, 2019, the appellant and his fellow officers were confronted with what can be properly characterized as a fluid and stressful situation, and as such, the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to fully think through his decisions. Second, the appellant exhibited good instincts when he first used the [conducted energy device] CED to perform an arc display in order to establish constructive authority over the unruly crowd and by not dropping the CED to the ground as he attempted to assist Bengochea. Third, the appellant exhibited concern not only for the safety of his fellow officers but for the crowd that had gathered as well.
The aggravating factors include the serious bodily injury the appellant caused LS. by striking him twice in the head with the CED.
In addition, the appellant’s prior disciplinary matters include the following:
. October 17, 2018, Violation of Excessive Force Policy (3:1.17)—four-day working-day suspension;
° September 5, 2013, Failure to Care for Assigned Vehicle (8:1.41)—one-day working-day suspension.
Administrative Law JudgeWeighing the mitigating and the aggravating factors, I conclude that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors. Here, the respondent sought a penalty of a twenty-day working-day suspension,
AnalysisAnger Management, and execution of a Last Chance Agreement. Under the circumstances presented here, such a penalty is disproportionate to the facts surrounding the sustained charges and ignores the mitigating factors that support a less stringent penalty.
I therefore CONCLUDE that the imposition of a ten-day working-day suspension is appropriate under the circumstances presented here. I further CONCLUDE that the circumstances do not support the execution of a Last Chance Agreement or the necessity of
Anger Management.!
Regarding the penalty, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission's review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.-J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George vu. North Princeton Developmenial Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway Siate Prison, 81 N.d. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007).
Administrative Law Judge1 The ALJ's ruling that the appointing authority could not impose a Last Chance Agreement and additional training was inappropriate. As those matters are not considered formal discipline under Civil Service law and rules, the ALJ should not have made any findings in that regard as the Commission has no jurisdiction over non-disciplinary discretionary actions taken by an appointing authority toward its employees. Regardless, such findings are moot. In this regard, if the appellant has not already undergone the training, as he is no longer employed he cannot now do so. See In the Matter of Stephen Hedberg (CSC, decided July 2, 2025) (Commission dismissed appeal of removal as moot pursuant to ordinary disability retirement, effective July 1, 2021). Similarly, since the ultimate disposition of the appellant’s separation in In the Matter of Stephen Hedberg (CSC, decided July 2, 2025) was not predicated on the Last Chance Agreement, any such agreement is of no moment.
AnalysisMoreover, the Commission emphasizes that a Police Officer is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 Nd. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.eJ. 567 (1990).
While the Commission acknowledges the mitigating factors listed by the ALJ, those factors do not outweigh the aggravating factors sufficient to warrant a reduction in penalty. Initially, the ALJ seems to minimize the appellant’s misconduct. While the situation was serious and in flux, and the appellant’s actions were initially appropriate, he thereafter improperly discharged his CED. Compounding that error, and even more concerning, was the fact that the appellant struck the civilian twice while still holding his CED. While he appropriately did not previously drop the CED, regardless of whether he truly forgot he was still holding it when he struck the civilian, it was wholly inappropriate to do so and, as per the charges, was a use of excessive force. Moreover, given that the appellant already had a recent previous four day suspension for violating the excessive force policy, the imposition of the original 20 working day suspension cannot be considered disproportionate.
ORDER
The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in suspending the appellant for 20 working days was justified. The Commission therefore affirms that action and dismisses the appeal of Stephen Hedberg.
ClosingThis is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.
Decisions this one cites
- Carter v. Bordentown 191 N.J. 474
- In the Matter of Stephen Hedberg (July 2, 2025)
- In the Matter of Stephen Hedberg (July 2, 2025)
- Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 Nd. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied 47 N.J. 80
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