Robert Cuevas, CSC Docket No. 2023-2164

BackgroundThe appeal of Robert Cuevas, Emergency Medical Technician, Pennsauken, Department of Public Safety, removal, effective February 10, 2023, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Elaine B. Frick, who rendered her initial decision on May 12, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, including a thorough review of the exceptions, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of June 11, 2025, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the attached ALJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to reverse the removal.

As indicated above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed by the appointing authority in this matter and finds them unpersuasive. In this regard, the ALJ’s determinations are predominantly based on her assessment of the credible evidence in the record. In this regard, while the ALJ did not make explicit credibility determinations, it is clear that she found the appellant’s testimony credible, and that no other evidence in the record substantially contradicted that testimony. The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.d. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. fd. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 Nd. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). In this matter, the exceptions filed are not persuasive in demonstrating that the ALJ’s determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. As such, the Commission has no reason to question those determinations, or the findings and conclusions made therefrom.

The Commission further rejects the appointing authority’s contention that the ALJ should have upheld the charge that the appellant was “involved” in a crime of moral turpitude. The ALJ clearly found that the evidence in the record did not support that the appellant’s actions were worthy of discipline. The criminal charge was never sustained and ultimately dismissed. Further, the ALJ found, and the Commission agrees, that none of the appellant’s other actions rose to an actionable “offense.” In this regard, the ALJ stated:

This administrative charge asserts that Cuevas was “involved” in a crime of moral turpitude. There has been no evidence presented to demonstrate that Cuevas retained personal property or cash belonging to another. The Township asserts that Cuevas held onto the wallet for an unspecified period of time. Retaining a found wallet for an “unspecified period of time” is not a crime of moral turpitude. The Township has not asserted that Cuevas committed theft by taking money from the wallet. They specifically assert that whether Cuevas stole money from the wallet is immaterial because the department cannot trust a public servant who “explicitly lied on two separate occasions during official investigations.”

There is no sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Cuevas was untruthful to the police or untruthful to the department. The department simply finds Cuevas to be disingenuous because there is no mention of him having a bathroom emergency in the summary statement in the affidavit of probable cause completed for the Complaint-Summons, yet he stated that he had a bathroom emergency in the questionnaire completed for the administrative investigation.

Administrative Law JudgeThe Township has failed to demonstrate that Cuevas was “involved” in a crime of moral turpitude. I CONCLUDE this administrative charge shall be DISMISSED.

AnalysisFinally, the Commission is not persuaded by the appointing authority’s argument that the ALJ did not make an assessment regarding the alleged false report charge. In the initial decision, the ALJ concluded that based on the appellant’s credible testimony and the other credible evidence in the record, that his actions regarding his possession and return of the wallet in question were not improper and that the information he provided in the investigations was not materially inconsistent and, thus, not false. For example, the ALJ states:

The unbecoming conduct the Township asserts Cuevas engaged in is that Cuevas lied to the police, and proceeded to lie to the

Department...

Cuevas testified that he held onto the wallet when he saw the address on the driver’s license and thought he would drop it off at the end of his shift. He tended to his bathroom emergency, but when he was disgusted with the condition of the Wawa bathroom, made his purchase, then left the Wawa to go back to the station. He used the bathroom there, then realized he left his cell phone at the Wawa. Since he returned to the Wawa to pick up his cell phone, he decided to turn the wallet in at the store since he was there. This is consistent with the answers provided in this questionnaire. The absence of his bathroom issues in the affidavit of probable cause prepared by a detective, relying upon a hearsay report by another officer, and providing only a brief summary, with no direct quotes attributed to Cuevas, does not demonstrate that

Administrative Law JudgeCuevas lied to the police. I CONCLUDE there is no evidence that

AnalysisCuevas led to the police since there is no mention of a bathroom emergency in the Complaint-Summons, and then lied to the department in his written answers to the administrative questionnaire.

Upon its review, the Commission finds nothing in the record or the exceptions demonstrating that this finding was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

Since the removal has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.Jd.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from the first date of separation without pay until the date of actual reinstatement.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses the removal and grants the appeal of Robert Cuevas.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from the appellant’s first date of separation without pay to the actual date of reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.dJ.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R, 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.