Marquis Jackson, CSC Docket No. 2023-2743

BackgroundThe appeal of Marquis Jackson, Custodial Worker, Newark School District, removal, effective May 24, 2023, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Daniel J. Brown (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on May 28, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant and a reply was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions, much of which do not require extensive comment, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on July 2, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and his recommendation to uphold the removal.

The Commission makes the following comments. The appellant admits to most of the misconduct alleged. Otherwise, the ALJ’s decision is based significantly on his assessment of the witnesses’ testimony. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[{T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 NJ. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). The

Commission finds no persuasive evidence in the record or the appellant’s exceptions to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions based on _ those determinations were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

Regarding the penalty, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee's prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007).

The Commission rejects the appellant’s arguments in his exceptions that since he was allowed to work for months after the infraction, it was not so serious to merit removal from employment. It similarly rejects his contention that it was his supervisor who should have borne the brunt of the responsibility, and therefore, the more severe disciplinary penalty. The ALJ dealt with both arguments in his initial decision. Regarding the first contention, the ALJ stated:

The appellant argues that that his conduct was not viewed as serious by

Newark and should not be viewed as serious by this tribunal because

Newark permitted him to continue working for approximately ninety days before Newark sought his removal. I reject this argument in its entirety, and I accept Newark’s argument that it viewed the appellant’s conduct as serious but kept the appellant in his position as it provided him with due process.

Clearly, it was within the appointing authority's discretion to initially impose an immediate suspension pursuant to N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.5. However, its decision to not do so does not negate the seriousness of the misconduct. In this regard, even if the appointing authority initially believed that it was most appropriate to allow the departmental-level due process to run its course before removing the appellant, it did, in fact, ultimately remove him for his infractions. The Commission also notes that the appellant was not a long-term permanent employee and his actions, as the ALJ noted “exhibited a significant lack of judgement on the appellant’s part. If the conduct were to be repeated, as the appellant promised that it would be, the safety and security of the students and staff of any school that the appellant would be assigned to would be at risk.” Such egregious misconduct cannot be allowed to be repeated.

The Commission finds the misconduct inimical to the goals of the appointing authority in ensuring the safety and security of its employees and student population.

The Commission similarly rejects the appellant’s “comparative” discipline argument. In this regard, the ALJ stated:

[T]he appellant argues for a lesser penalty the appellant’s supervisor only received a written warning. However, the appellant fails to recognize that his conduct was substantially different than that of the supervisor in that the appellant actively propped doors open and the supervisor did not. Additionally, I view the appellant’s lack of appropriate judgement as extremely serious as he stated that he would repeat it if he were restored to his position.

The Commission agrees with the above assessment. Moreover, it is clear that the appellant’s misconduct warrants removal, regardless of the actions taken against any of the others involved. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the appellant's misconduct makes him unsuitable for continued public employment, and his removal is neither disproportionate to the offense nor shocking to the conscious.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore upholds that action and dismisses the appeal of Marquis Jackson.

ClosingThis is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.