Christopher Livoti, CSC Docket No. 2024-742

BackgroundThe appeal of Christopher Livoti, County Correctional Police Officer, Bergen County, Sheriff’s Office, removal, effective May 9, 2023, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Patrice E. Hobbs, who rendered her initial decision on October 27, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant and a reply was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of November 26, 2025, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusion as contained in the attached ALJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to uphold the removal.

As indicated above, the Commission thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed in this matter. Upon that review, it finds no reason to extensively comment as those filings do not persuade the Commission that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions, or her recommendation to uphold the removal were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The main thrust of the appellant’s myriad exceptions pertain to the ALJ’s credibility determinations. In this regard, the ALJ’s decision is based significantly on her assessment of the witnesses’ testimony. The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). Upon its review and notwithstanding the appellant’s arguments in the exceptions, the Commission finds no persuasive evidence in the record or the exceptions to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions based on her credibility determinations were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

The appellant also argues that the penalty imposed should be something short of removal. The Commission disagrees. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that a County Correctional Police Officer is a law enforcement officer who, by the very nature of his job duties, is held to a higher standard of conduct than other public employees. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990). Moreover, even when a County Correctional Police Officer does not possess a prior disciplinary record after many unblemished years of employment, the seriousness of an offense such as in this matter may, nevertheless, warrant the penalty of removal.

Administrative Law JudgeRegarding the penalty, the ALJ found that:

Livoti argues that zero tolerance and termination should not apply in this case because the policy is meant to protect the integrity of the department by preventing knowing and deliberate drug use. Livoti asserts that there is no evidence of illegal steroid use and that the presence of these steroid metabolites is due to the ingestion of nutritional supplements. However, even Livoti’s own expert cannot account for the presence of drostanolone in the lab results. There are instances where the Commission has given other officers second chances when the positive test result is due to inadvertence. See In Re Aponte,

Analysis2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1491 (App. Div. July 20, 2021). Aponte claimed that his positive drug test for cocaine was a result of his ingestion of a supplement containing a derivative of cocaine and that he did not read the label carefully enough to know it contained a banned substance that could lead to a positive drug test. Aponte had an explanation for the presence of the controlled substance, albeit a very reckless explanation, and the ALJ and the Commission determined that rehabilitation was a more appropriate punishment for his recklessness.

Livoti is not claiming recklessness for the presence of the steroids in his urine sample.

The facts of this case are much more in line with In re S.D., 2024

N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 266 (App. Div. Feb. 22, 2024). S.D. claimed that his positive drug test was caused by the passive inhalation of his wife’s medicinal marijuana smoke, and he did not think he should have reported his wife’s marijuana use. The expert in S.D. could not say with certainty that the positive drug test was from passive inhalation. The

Court affirmed the ALJ’s analysis of the law, noting specifically the higher standard of behavior to which police officers are held, the

Attorney General’s and Department’s regulations, and the unequivocally mandated termination of employment for positive drug tests. In both Aponte and S.D., the officers gave a reason for the presence of the banned substance in their urine samples; one was a reckless explanation, and the other was speculation. Here, Livoti offers no explanation for the presence of drostanolone metabolite more than two weeks after he last took any supplements. Livoti’s expert also offers no explanation for the presence of the drostanolone metabolite.

However, respondent’s expert does: it must have been intravenously injected.

I therefore CONCLUDE that Livoti must be terminated from his position as a county correctional police officer because of the presence of a controlled substance, namely drostanolone metabolite, which could not have been present in his bloodstream other than by intentional intravenous injection and is a violation of the respondent’s General

Order for a Drug Free Workplace and the Attorney General’s Law

Enforcement Drug Testing Policy.

The Commission wholeheartedly agrees with the above assessment and finds that removal from employment is neither disproportionate to the offenses nor shocking to the conscious.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore affirms that action and dismisses the appeals of Christopher Livoti.

ClosingThis is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.