Ranique Woodson, CSC Docket No. 2024-832

BackgroundThe appeal of Ranique Woodson, Clerk 1, Newark, Mayor’s Department, removal, effective August 10, 2022, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Daniel J. Brown (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on August 6, 2024. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority and a reply was filed by the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent, de novo evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on September 4, 2024, adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to grant the appointing authority’s motion for summary decision. However, the Commission disagreed with the ALJ that a six-month suspension was the proper penalty and imposed a 60 working day suspension.

In its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that the appellant's appeal should have been dismissed since it was not timely filed under N.e/.A.C. 4A:2-2.8. In support, it argues that the appellant was sent, via certified mail, a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA), dated June 26, 2023. Thus, it argues that her appeal in October 2023 was clearly late. It also argues that the appellant was inconsistent in indicating her actual receipt of the FNDA, at one juncture stating it was September 28, 2023, and later stating it was October 2, 2023. Further, it argues that, via her filings with other agencies and in communications with it she knew of her employment status significantly before her receipt of the FNDA. The Commission rejects these contentions. In its review of the submissions, while the appellant was apparently seeking relief in other forums, those submissions indicate her belief that she was still on indefinite suspension and was, essentially, attempting to be reinstated. Moreover, the appointing authority has not persuasively demonstrated that the appellant either knew she was actually removed from employment until her receipt of the FNDA, or that she received the FNDA any date earlier than September 28, 2023. The Commission further notes that the FNDA was apparently mailed to the appellant’s former address. Finally, whether the appellant received the FNDA on September 28, 2023, or October 2, 2023, her appeal to the Commission of that FNDA by submission postmarked October 13, 2023, is clearly timely under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.8..

That leaves the issue of the proper penalty to be imposed. In his initial decision, in recommending reducing the removal to a six-month suspension, the ALJ stated:

progressive discipline can be bypassed when the work involves public safety, and the misconduct causes a risk of harm to persons or property.

Administrative Law Judge[citation omitted]. Respondent argues that progressive discipline should be bypassed in this case. I disagree. While appellant clearly committed misconduct, her work does not directly involve public safety.

AnalysisAdditionally, appellant's failure to report her arrest and work from an unauthorized location did not create a risk of harm to persons or property. Thus, an analysis under progressive discipline is appropriate in this case.

Administrative Law JudgeRespondent removed Appellant from employment, but I CONCLUDE that Appellant should receive a lesser penalty under progressive discipline. Appellant has been employed with the municipal court for the city of Newark since January 2020 and has only [one] other occurrence of discipline in her employment history. Further, the fact that the criminal charges were dismissed, and that appellant worked from an unauthorized location for a relatively a short period of time mitigate the penalty. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that a six-month suspension strikes a balance between Appellant’s misconduct, the Respondent’s need to ensure compliance with its rules, and the public interest.

AnalysisRegarding the penalty, similar to its review of the underlying charges, the Commission's review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual's disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N..J. 474 (2007).

In this matter, the Commission agrees with the ALJ’s recommendation to modify the removal to a lesser penalty. However, it does not agree that a six-month suspension is the proper penalty. Notwithstanding the appellant’s short tenure, the infractions committed are not so egregious as to support removal, nor a six-month suspension, which is the highest suspension permitted. Further, while the ALJ refers to a prior discipline, the record is unclear as to what that disciplinary action was. As such, and as well as based on the other reasons presented by the ALJ above, a further reduction in penalty is appropriate. Accordingly, while the Commission is in no way is minimizing the appellant’s misconduct, it finds that a 60 working day suspension should serve as more than sufficient notice to the appellant that any future misconduct will result in more severe discipline.

Since the removal has been modified, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from 60 working days after the first date of separation without pay until the date of actual reinstatement.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to her permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore modifies that action to a 60 working day suspension.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from 60 working days after the first date of separation without pay to the actual date of reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.