Matthew Ruding, CSC Docket No. 2025-1492

BackgroundThe appeal of Matthew Ruding, Assistant County Park Superintendent, Monmouth County, Department of Parks, removal, effective January 9, 2025, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Michael R. Stanzione (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on July 17, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant, and a reply was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on August 12, 2026, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and his recommendation to uphold the removal.

In his exceptions, the appellant argues that the ALJ made several errors. Initially, he contends the ALJ incorrectly listed the appellant’s name on the witness list, omitted witnesses that testified during the hearing from that list, and failed to summarize those witnesses’ testimony. More substantively, the appellant argues that the appointing authority failed to establish the charges by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, as to the charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee, he contends that his actions did not have a tendency to “destroy public trust” in the appointing authority’s operations since he was off-duty and not on the appointing authority’s premises. Regarding the ethics violation charge, he maintains that there is no evidence that he was seeking to use his official position to secure “unwarranted privileges” as required in the policy. Finally, he argues that as a 16-year employee with an unblemished disciplinary record, removal is unwarranted.

In reply, the appointing authority indicates that the contemporaneous videos of the incident clearly refute the appellant’s claims. It contends that the ALJ properly summarized and considered the credible testimony of the pertinent Harrah’s Casino witnesses in upholding the charges. It also maintains that regardless of the appellant’s work status at the time of the incident, his misconduct clearly met the parameters of conduct unbecoming a public employee. It further states that the ALJ found that the appellant “attempted to use his official position to secure a privilege or advantage for himself . . .,” refuting the appellant’s argument in that regard. Finally, it maintains that, regardless of the appellant’s years of service and lack of a disciplinary history, based on the severity and scope of the misconduct, removal from employment is warranted.

The Commission makes the following comments. The ALJ’s decision is based significantly on his assessment of the witnesses’ testimony. In this regard, he explicitly found the appellant’s version of the incident not credible, stating:

Administrative Law JudgeAs the factfinder, I had the ability to observe the demeanor, tone, and physical actions of respondent’s witnesses during their testimony concerning their understanding of the incident and the procedures they employed. They testified clearly and convincingly about their observations of appellant and his behavior. They also testified professionally and without equivocation concerning the policies and procedures for assessing a situation and maintaining order throughout the casino. Their testimony also seemed to align with the video presented, although there was no audio. I find their testimony to be credible.

AnalysisAs the fact finder, I had the ability to observe the demeanor, tone, and physical actions of appellant during his testimony and throughout the proceeding. Appellant comported himself in a manner that suggested he was less credible. He did not offer documentary or other evidence to support an assertion that he was only looking out for his friend and was not being combative with Harrah’s personnel. He also did not convincingly explain his actions, which were shown on video.

Given the absence of evidence supporting appellant’s assertions, I cannot afford his testimony equal weight to that of respondent’s witnesses.

The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div.

2004). In its de novo review, the Commission finds that the appellant has not presented one scintilla of evidence to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions based on those determinations were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

As to the appellant’s other exceptions, the Commission rejects the argument regarding the witness list and summary of the testimony. While the ALJ did mislabel and omit individuals from the witness list and did not present a summary of all the witness testimony,1 the appellant has not demonstrated in any way how those “errors” detrimentally effect the ALJ’s credibility findings or analysis of the documentary evidence, or how the errors/omissions would otherwise support his non- credible testimony. It similarly rejects the contention regarding the conduct unbecoming a public employee charge. Clearly, as a high-level employee representing the appointing authority at an off-site conference, the appellant’s actions, whether on- or off-duty, were highly inappropriate and certainly could tend to significantly negatively impact the operations and perception of the appointing authority. Moreover, such misconduct need not be “on-duty” to be sanctionable for a public employee. See e.g. Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998). Further, the Commission wholly dismisses the appellant’s contention that he did not seek “unwarranted privileges” when he showed his badge.2 In this regard, the ALJ explicitly found that the appellant “attempted to use his official position to secure a privilege or advantage for himself . . .” when he showed his badge. Most importantly, the ALJ did not find the appellant’s explanation in that regard credible, and the Commission finds nothing in the record to question that finding. Moreover, while the ALJ did not indicate the privilege the appellant was attempting to elicit was “unwarranted,” such a conclusion is implicit given that totality of the factual findings in this matter.

Finally, regarding the penalty, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007).

1 On the witness list, the ALJ listed the appellant as “Jean” Ruding and failed to list and summarize the testimony of two other appointing authority witnesses. As described herein, the typographical error and omissions do not present any basis to otherwise discredit the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. 2 It is noted that the badge was not pertinent to the appellant’s current position, but rather, was issued when the appellant served as a County Park Ranger, which is considered a law enforcement position.

Here it is clear that the appellant’s described and sustained misconduct was egregious and cannot be minimized. As credibly described by the witnesses and supported by the other evidence in the record, the appellant was involved in an aggressive and violent altercation with security personnel seeking to do their jobs and attempted to use his position to escape or minimize his culpability. Moreover, the appellant’s attempts to minimize his misconduct via his non-credible testimony and in his exceptions fails to persuade the Commission that his otherwise clean record of service serves as a sufficient mitigating factor to allow for a modification of the penalty. Succinctly stated, while the appellant’s long record of service without discipline is noted and commendable, the appellant’s misconduct in this case is inimical to what the public expects from a public employee. As such, a penalty less than removal would serve to undermine the public trust. Accordingly, the Commission finds the penalty of removal neither disproportionate to the offense nor shocking to the conscious.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore upholds that action and dismisses the appeal of Matthew Ruding.

ClosingThis is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.