Nicholas Taylor Camden County Department of Corrections, CSC Docket No. 2025-2854

BackgroundThe appeal of Nicholas Taylor, a Correctional Police Officer with Camden County, Department of Corrections, appeals his removal, effective February 14, 2025, on charges, was before Administrative Law Judge Tama B. Hughes (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on April 29, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant, and a reply was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached ALJ’s initial decision, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of June 10, 2026, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the ALJ’s initial decision and the recommendation to uphold the removal.

The Commission makes the following comments. As indicated above, the Commission thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed by the appointing authority in this matter. The Commission finds the exceptions unpersuasive as the ALJ’s findings and conclusions in upholding the removal were based on his thorough assessment of the record and are not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or legally incorrect. In his exceptions, the appellant argued that the ALJ’s credibility determinations were flawed because he did not give due consideration to the fact that the appointing authority witnesses were inconsistent as to the amount and type of physical training and defensive tactics training the appellant received. The appellant also contends that the ALJ misrepresented the testimony of his expert witness Glenn Garrels. The

Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri v. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004).

In this matter, the exceptions filed by the appointing authority are not persuasive in demonstrating that the ALJ’s credibility determinations, or his findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. In this regard, the ALJ concluded that testimony of the appointing authority’s witnesses regarding the investigation, departmental policies and procedures, and conclusions, was detailed and consistent with the evidence presented in the matter and found all their respective testimony to make sense and be credible. While their testimony may have differed on the level of training that the appellant may have received, as the appointing authority indicated in its reply to exceptions, the appellant fails to refute that he received regular relevant training on de- escalation, use of force, and OC spray. The ALJ’s lack of addressing the specific difference regarding training presented by the appointing authority’s witnesses does not diminish her conclusions of the testimony based on the totality of the testimony and evidence presented. Similarly, while the appellant claims some of Garrels’ testimony was mischaracterized, the ALJ made specific findings regarding the balance of his testimony which led to her finding that the appointing authority’s expert witness, Bruce Carber’s testimony more persuasive. Specifically, regarding Carber’s testimony in the use of force in law enforcement, particularly in corrections facilities, the ALJ stated:

Carber’s analysis of the video, reports, and departmental protocols, in conjunction with his years of experience in corrections, made sense. His analysis was thorough and lacked any material inconsistencies. His opinion, that insulting words by an inmate does not justify use of physical force by an officer, was supported by the pertinent Rules of

Conduct and General Orders, which were applicable in this matter but not limited to General Order #13, There is no question that an officer does not have to wait to be physically assaulted before using physical force against an inmate; however, the decision to use force requires objective, reasonable facts demonstrating that there is an immediate threat or danger to the officer. As succinctly stated by Carber, [the inmate] committed no action that could reasonably be believed to be an immediate threat against Taylor and certainly no action that required the use of both mechanical and physical force against [the inmate]-more specifically, spraying [the inmate] point-blank in the face with OC Spray and then performing a physical takedown of [the inmate] in his cell, while [the inmate] was holding his hands up to his face and had his back to Taylor.

Administrative Law JudgeIn comparison, regarding Glenn Garrels, the appellant’s use of force expert, the ALJ commented:

I found Garrels’ analysis and opinion to be flawed and less persuasive.

AnalysisHis findings were undermined by his lack of knowledge of the corrections system, having never worked in it, and reliance upon IA statements and reports that were collectively inconsistent with one another and inconsistent with body camera footage as well as the

Ocularis footage.

Further, concerning Garrels, the ALJ stated:

Garrels repeatedly stated in both his report and his testimony that [the inmate] was an active and aggressive resister. He also testified that the

Department failed to recognize the possibility that de-escalation was not feasible. Further, he repeatedly testified that [the inmate] was not injured after the “takedown,” which infers that the lack of injury meant that the force used was both appropriate and not excessive. When questioned on how he arrived at such conclusions, his responses were specious and lacked foundation in the record. He acknowledged for instance the highlighted statement in his report, which he believed bolstered Taylor’s concerns for his safety, that [the inmate’s] fists were balled, was inaccurate. He also couldn’t say whether Taylor’s statement that he (Taylor) backed up before he took the OC spray was accurate based upon the footage, yet he relied upon it in rendering his opinion.

Garrels also glossed over the lack of de-escalation commands and actions that Taylor could have given or done if he perceived a threat, but did not. Garrels also lacked an understanding of why the cell door should have been shut after spraying the OC spray, instead insisting that it was violative of the OC spray policy and that it just didn’t make sense to him. Again, such comments reflect a lack of understanding of the corrections mores and rationale for the same, and de-escalation techniques that are utilized daily in the prison system.

Therefore, on the whole, Garrels’ testimony regardless of any alleged mischaracterization, was flawed and less persuasive than the appointing authority’s expert witness.

Moreover, the appellant contends that removal was not proportionate and the ALJ’s finding that the conduct was egregious was not reasonable considering the misrepresentations of testimony addressed above. Similar to its review of the underlying charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to considering the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). Further, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the principle of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Even when a Correctional Police Officer does not possess a prior disciplinary record after many unblemished years of employment, the seriousness of an offense occurring in the environment of a correctional facility may, nevertheless, warrant the penalty of removal where it compromises the safety and security of the institution, or has the potential to subvert prison order and discipline.1 In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that a Correctional Police Officer is a law enforcement officer who, by the very nature of his job duties, is held to a higher standard of conduct than other public employees. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990). Moreover, the Commission is also mindful that:

The appraisal of the seriousness of [the appellant’s] offense and degree to which such offenses subvert discipline . . . are matters peculiarly within the expertise of the corrections officials. The appraisal is subject to de novo review by the

[Commission], Henry v. Rahway State Prison, supra, but that appraisal should be given significant weight. Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 306 (App. Div.

1993), cert. denied, 135 N.J. 469 (1994).

In the instant matter, the appellant’s actions in spraying an inmate without cause and body slamming the inmate to the ground were particularly egregious. In this regard, the Commission notes that the ALJ found that the appellant’s actions in this incident were not reasonable. In making her determination as to reasonableness, the ALJ used the standards for law enforcement officers charged with excessive force to be analyzed under the reasonableness standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment and set forth by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) and Barnes v. Felix 605 U.S. 73 (2025).

Administrative Law Judge1 The ALJ noted that the appellant was hired August 6, 2012, and his record evidenced 12 prior disciplinary actions, including written reprimands. Agency records indicate four minor disciplinary actions, two each in 2018 and 2020.

Specifically, the ALJ stated:

[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, there was no reasonable basis for the appellant’s actions. There were no reports of [the inmate] acting out from the previous shift and the appellant went on shift an hour before the incident. As set forth in greater detail above in the findings of fact, at no time was [the inmate] an active or threatening assailant.

AnalysisYet, even assuming [the inmate] was being verbally insulting, which does not rise to the level of a threatening and/or active assailant, without any warning, and without any attempt to de-escalate the situation, appellant sprayed [the inmate] point-blank in the face with OC spray.

[The inmate] immediately covered his face and then turned and went to the back of the cell, where the appellant staled up behind him and picked him up from behind and slammed him on the floor. Under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable officer would have used any force- mechanical or physical-much less the excessive force the appellant used on [the inmate].

Accordingly, given the appellant’s egregious behavior, removal is clearly the appropriate penalty.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore affirms that action and dismisses the appeal of Nicholas Taylor.

ClosingThis is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.