Vincent Vidinha, CSC Docket No. 2026-1696

BackgroundThe appeal of Vincent Vidinha, Firefighter, Newark, Fire Division, removal, effective December 19, 2025, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Patrice E. Hobbs (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on August 3, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant, and a reply was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent, de novo evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on September 2, 2026, remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for further proceedings.

Initially, the Commission notes that the ALJ recommended dismissing the charge of inability to perform duties.1 Upon its de novo review, it agrees with the ALJ, and no further action in that regard is required upon remand. The purpose of the remand is described below.

Administrative Law JudgeIn her initial decision, the ALJ essentially based her decision to uphold the charge of other sufficient cause on testimony from the doctor who performed the appellant’s 2025 fitness-for-duty examination. Specifically, the ALJ indicated that Dr. Ingrid Diaz testified that the appellant admitted to her that “he had relapsed.” Further, the ALJ credited Dr. Diaz’s opinion that:

Analysis1 While initially properly indicating the charge as inability to perform duties under N.J.A.C. 4A:2- 2.3(a)3, the ALJ later incorrectly indicates the charge as “failure to perform duties” under N.J.A.C. “4A:2-2.1(a)1.” This typographical error is of no import and does not change the Commission’s agreement with the ALJ regarding the dismissal of that charge.

Administrative Law JudgeBased on Vidinha’s statement that his whole world could “implode,” his medical history, his prior drug use and alcohol abuse history, and his admission that he abstained from drug use from 2022-2024, [she] opined that Vidinha’s relapse was physical and that he had been using heroin.

Additionally, the ALJ credited both Diaz and another witness who testified that the appellant did not provide consent for either Diaz or the appointing authority to obtain his medical records while he was at a rehabilitation facility. Based on the above, the ALJ determined that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the appellant had used drugs and thus, violated the letter of conditional employment. She recommended upholding the removal on that basis.

AnalysisUpon its de novo review, the Commission has concerns. The ALJ’s decision is based on the testimony of Dr. Diaz that the appellant told her that he relapsed and most critically, her opinion, based on the circumstances, that the nature of the relapse involved drug use. Since the appellant does not appear to dispute Dr. Diaz’s testimony that he had relapsed, the Commission has no basis to reject that evidence. 2 See N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5. However, Dr. Diaz’s opinion as to the nature of the relapse, absent some other tangible evidence, would not normally satisfy the appointing authority’s burden of proof. In that regard, the medical records from the rehabilitation center could provide such evidence. However, the ALJ found that the appellant did not consent to the release of those records. Notably, in his exceptions, the appellant disputes that characterization, stating the ALJ:

inexplicably found that Dr. Diaz and the City sought Firefighter

Vidinha’s records from the Shatterproof Program but were unsuccessful because Vidinha did not provide consent. Nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Diaz or the City of Newark sought his medical records or Vidinha’s consent to obtain them. The Initial Decision portrays

Firefighter Vidinha as uncooperative by not providing consent to retrieve his medical records . . . The Initial Decision cannot assign a negative connotation for events and conduct that never occurred.

The main goal of the Commission is to seek and obtain the truth. To do so, it requires further proceedings in this matter. Based on the appellant’s representations above, it does not appear that he is averse to providing consent to the appointing authority allowing it to obtain the pertinent medical records, which clearly bear on this matter. Those records will assist in providing evidence to confirm Dr. Diaz’s opinion as to the nature of the relapse, or conversely, negatively bear on the credibility of that opinion. Accordingly, the Commission orders that this matter be remanded to the OAL for further proceedings as follows. The ALJ shall reopen the record and afford the appointing authority the opportunity to request consent from the appellant to obtain the pertinent medical records. Upon the appointing authority’s receipt of those records, the ALJ, at her discretion, will determine how to best proceed via further hearing proceedings or otherwise. If further hearing proceedings are conducted, the appellant should be permitted to testify regarding the content of the medical records if he chooses to do so. If the appellant fails to provide consent to obtain the records, the ALJ may close the record and may draw an adverse inference from that lack of consent and consider that, as applicable, along with the already existing evidence in the record.

2 The fact that the appellant voluntarily admitted himself into a rehabilitation facility bolsters this finding.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission remands this matter to the Office of Administrative Law for further proceedings as described above.