Tiffany Cobourne, CSC Docket No. 2022-1531

BackgroundThe appeal of Tiffany Cobourne, Human Services Specialist 2, Camden County Board of Social Services, of her 60 working day suspension, effective December 7, 2021, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Carl V. Buck III (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on June 23, 2026.1 Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions filed on behalf of the appellant, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of July 22, 2026, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the attached ALJ’s initial decision and his recommendation to modify the penalty to a 45 working day suspension.

As indicated above, the Commission has reviewed the appellant’s exceptions in this matter and finds them unconvincing. The Commission makes the following comment. The Commission agrees with the ALJ’s determinations regarding the charges, which were substantially based on his assessment of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witness. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri v. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). The Commission finds no persuasive evidence in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ’s credibility determinations, or his findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Commission finds nothing in the record to question those determinations or the findings and conclusions made therefrom.

1 For privacy reasons, sensitive information regarding the appellant’s daughter has been redacted from the ALJ’s attached decision.

Regarding the penalty, the Commission’s review, like its review of the underlying charges, is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007).

In modifying the penalty from a 60 working day suspension to a 45 working day suspension, the ALJ stated the following:

Administrative Law JudgeIn applying progressive discipline, I weigh [the] appellant’s time with the [Camden County Board of Social Services (Board)] with one instance of discipline—albeit that that discipline carried no penalty beyond a verbal warning. Further, I do not find [the] appellant’s argument that leaving the workplace was necessary due to an emergency with her daughter to be persuasive. Considering [the] appellant’s time spent working for the Board, presumed experience, and knowledge of union rules and Board policies in the workplace and presentation in a government/business setting for a period of nine years, there can be no excuse nor any equivocation about leaving the workplace without notice or authorization; having a fight with neighbors; and getting arrested— whether [the] appellant thought it was an emergency or not. I do find a mitigating factor in that the charge of misuse of public property is not founded.

Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that a forty-five-day suspension is the appropriate penalty.

AnalysisThe Commission agrees with the above assessment and finds that a 45 working day suspension is neither disproportionate to the offense nor shocking to the conscience.

Since the appellant’s suspension has been modified, the appellant is entitled to 15 working days of back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2- 2.10. However, she is not entitled to counsel fees. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in the disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). In the case at hand, although one charge was dismissed and the penalty was modified by the Commission, charges were sustained, and major discipline was imposed. Consequently, as the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12, counsel fees must be denied.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in suspending the appellant was justified. However, it modifies the 60 working day suspension of the appellant to a 45 working day suspension.

The Commission further orders that the appellant be granted 15 working days of back pay, benefits, and seniority as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. Counsel fees are denied.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division