Willie Smith, CSC Docket No. 2023-827

BackgroundThe appeal of Willie Smith, an Assistant Superintendent, Residential Group Center, with the Youth Justice Commission, of his removal, effective June 30, 2022, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Ernest M. Bongiovanni (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on November 13, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on December 17, 2025, did not adopt the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and his recommendation to uphold the removal. Rather, the Commission reversed the removal.

DISCUSSION

The appellant was removed on charges of insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and other sufficient cause. Specifically, it was asserted that the appellant failed to comply with Executive Order 283 and 290 regarding the COVID-19 vaccine. Upon the appellant’s appeal, the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing as a contested case.

Administrative Law JudgeIn his initial decision, the ALJ found that after seeking and being denied a religious exemption, the appellant made no effort to abide by the terms of Executive Orders 283 and 290. Although the appellant complained that the appointing

Analysis| The agency was previously known as the Juvenile Justice Commission.

authority never mentioned an acceptable accommodation that it could make, the ALJ determined that the burden was on the appellant to offer an accommodation and that there was no need for the appointing authority to suggest accommodations it could make. Based on the testimony of the appointing authority’s witnesses and job specification, the ALJ found that employees in appellant’s title, Assistant Superintendent, have to have a presence in the facility and have to be walking the facility and interacting with staff and young people throughout the day every day and found that the appellant’s claim that he rarely had to interact with stuff not credible. He also determined that the evidence demonstrated that there was no accommodation other than getting someone else to perform some of the appellant’s duties. Accordingly, the ALJ recommended that the charges of insubordination and conduct unbecoming an employee be affirmed but made no finding regarding the charge of other sufficient cause. The ALJ concluded that the appellant’s removal was sustained.

Upon its de novo review of the record, the Commission rejects the recommendation of the ALJ that the appointing authority sustained its burden of proof and that the charges should be sustained. Rather, the Commission dismissed all the charges and reversed the removal.

Much of the ALJ’s decision is based significantly on his assessment of the witnesses’ testimony. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings ... are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.cJ. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.dJ. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.eJ. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004).

Upon its review, the Commission finds that the record does not evidence that an actual interactive process for a religious accommodation had occurred. In US Airways, Inc v. Barnett, 5385 U.S. 391 (2002), the United States Supreme Court set out a burden-shifting scheme for reasonable accommodation cases. Plaintiff generally bears the burden of proving that the proposed accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401; see also 535 U.S. at 409-410 [O’Connor, J., concurring]. If plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the accommodation, though reasonable as a general matter, imposes an undue hardship on the defendant due to the defendant’s particular circumstances. Id. 535 U.S. at 402.

The former Administrative Officer for the Youth Justice Commission testified that in implementing Executive Order 283, it first split staff into two categories, one “covered workers” and another, “noncovered workers.” “Covered workers” were those individuals that would regularly enter the building or have a need to enter the building. The appellant’s denial of a religious accommodation was based solely on his status as a “covered worker” and that the “kids” in their care require face to face interaction. In other words, instead of going through the interactive process, the appointing authority pre-determined that the “covered workers” would not be eligible for an accommodation, improperly shifting the appointing authority's burden to show undue hardship to the appellant. Regardless, while the appointing authority’s witnesses testified that the appellant was not allowed to work remotely, the appellant’s testimony was undisputed that at the time of his termination in 2022, “his work hours had been changed so that two days out of five of the work week he was permitted to work ‘remotely’ on Sunday and Monday, while continuing to work at the juvenile residential facility in Newark [on] Tuesdays|[,] Wednesdays and Thursdays.” Thus, it appears that an accommodation was in fact possible that was reasonable on its face. Under these circumstances, the charges against the appellant should be dismissed and the appellant reinstated.

Since the removal has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Moreover, as the appellant has prevailed, he is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay or counsel fees are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses the removal and grants the appeal of Willie Smith.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits and seniority from the time of his removal to the date of his actual reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that counsel fees be awarded to the attorney for the appellant pursuant to N.eJ.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 and N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.12 the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay or counsel fees. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay or counsel fees dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.