Na’Asha Brown, CSC Docket No. 2024-1336

BackgroundThe appeal of Na’Asha Brown, a County Correctional Police Officer with Mercer County, Department of Corrections, of her removal, effective February 15, 2023, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Mary Ann Bogan (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on February 24, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority, and a reply was filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of April 8, 2026, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as contained in the ALJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to reverse the removal.

As indicated above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed by the appointing authority in this matter and finds them unpersuasive. In this regard, the ALJ’s determinations are based on her assessment of the credible evidence in the record. The ALJ found the appointing authority failed to sustain its burden of proving the charges by a preponderance of the evidence given deficiencies in the appointing authority’s investigation and the evidence the appointing authority cited in support of the charges at issue. Notably, in her initial decision, the ALJ stated:

[T]he proofs relied upon by respondent to charge Appellant Brown and terminate her employment, at best rests on bare boned conclusions.

Other than the scant evidence produced by the investigation and the

FBI’s determination that the writing samples were not concltisive to identify the author of the writing, no one knows for sure how the letters, dangerous substance and cell phone ended up in Inmate K’s jail cell. It is significant that respondent failed to gather a more thorough record[,] in particular],] full and complete statements from the correction officers with knowledge, and Appellant Brown. Instead [the appointing authority] relied upon an incarcerated inmate who is less than credible and was motivated to provide information so that he could be granted a transfer to a jail near his home, to be the final piece of evidence that caused the charges to be filed.

Specifically, regarding the charges, the ALJ’s determinations were based on her assessment of the credibility of the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record and her assessment of the credibility of that evidence. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.-J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). In this matter, the exceptioris filed aré not persuasive in demonstrating that the ALJ’s determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. As such, the Commission has no reason to question those determinations or the findings and conclusions made therefrom. Therefore, upon its de novo review, the Commission finds nothing in the record or the exceptions demonstrating that the ALJ’s assessment of the charges, finding that the appointing authority did not sustain its burden of proof, was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the charges were properly dismissed and the appellant’s removal should be reversed.

Since the removal has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Moreover, as the appellant has prevailed, she is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay or counsel fees are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to her permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses the removal and grants the appeal of Na’Asha Brown.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from the time of her removal to the date of her actual reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that counsel fees be awarded to the attorney for the appellant pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay or counsel fees. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay or counsel fees dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.