Joseph Sheriffs Office, CSC Docket No. 2024-2023

BackgroundThe appeal of Joseph Campolattaro, Sheriff's Officer, Bergen County, Sheriff's Office, removal, effective March 19, 2024, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Patrice E, Hobbs (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on January 14, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority and a reply to exceptions was filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALuJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on February 26, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions and her recommendation to modify the removal to a six-month suspension. However, the Commission also ordered that the appellant undergo a psychological fitness-for-duty examination prior to his return to duty, and also continue mental health counseling. Finally, the Commission reversed the ALJ’s award of counsel fees.

Administrative Law JudgeIn this matter, the ALJ found that the appellant was guilty of the infractions alleged. Upon its de novo review of the ALdJ’s determinations in that regard, the Commission agrees with the ALJ’s findings and finds nothing in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings regarding the charges were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

AnalysisIn its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that removal is the proper penalty in this matter. In this regard, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the

Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual's disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Even when a law enforcement officer does not possess a prior disciplinary record after many unblemished years of employment, the seriousness of an offense may nevertheless warrant the penalty of removal where it is likely to undermine the public trust. In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that a Sheriffs Officer, like a municipal Police Officer, is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).

Administrative Law JudgeIn this matter, the ALJ performed an analysis of the penalty to be imposed. In that regard, the ALJ stated:

Even though Campolattaro has been disciplined before for a previous alcohol-related incident, that incident was an off-duty incident, and it was also treated as such, with only a ninety-day suspension.

AnalysisAlthough Campolattaro was also intoxicated at the time of this incident, this was not an alcohol-related, off-duty incident. It was an officer in crisis who was experiencing mental health issues. Although it does not excuse the misconduct, it at least explains it. Moreover, Campolattaro is extremely remorseful and continues to receive mental health counseling. His fellow officers all acted out of deep care and concern for him when they found him at the warehouse. None of the officers who came to the warehouse turned on their body cameras as protocol required. Everyone treated the entire incident as an officer in crisis.

Administrative Law JudgeFor all these reasons, especially his mental health issues that reached a crescendo at the warehouse, I CONCLUDE that a suspension for six months is the appropriate penalty.

AnalysisWhile the appointing authority believes the removal should be upheld, for all of the reasons expressed by the ALJ above, the Commission can support the modification to a six-month suspension. That penalty, the most severe suspension permitted under Civil Service law and rules, should serve as a warning to the appellant that any future misconduct with likely result in his removal from employment. However, given the circumstances, the Commission orders that the appointing authority send the appellant for a psychological fitness-for-duty examination prior to his actual return to duty. Should he be found not fit for duty, the appointing authority should issue any new disciplinary charges based on the unfitness at that time. It also orders that the appellant continue to receive mental health counseling as indicted in the ALJ’s initial decision.

Since the removal has been modified, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated to his position with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from six-months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay! until the date he is returned to duty after the above fitness-for-duty examination or otherwise disciplined for being found unfit for duty.

However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees. In this regard, the ALJ's award in that regard was improper. N.d/.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in a disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). Thus, where, as here, a penalty is modified but charges are sustained and major discipline is imposed, counsel fees must be denied since the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Delores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, subject to the fitness-for-duty examination ordered herein, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore modifies that action to a six-month suspension.

The Commission orders that the appointing authority send the appellant for a psychological fitness-for-duty examination prior to his actual return to duty. Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant continue his mental health counseling. The Commission further orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from six-months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is returned to duty after the above fitness-for-duty examination or otherwise disciplined for being found unfit for duty. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2- 2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

Analysis1 In this regard, if the appellant was immediately suspended without pay prior to the effective date of his removal, the imposed six-month suspension begins as of that date, and the back pay period starts six months later. See e.g. In the Matter of Ranique Woodson (CSC, decided January 15, 2025).

OrderCounsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.