Vincent Conti, CSC Docket No. 2024-2280

BackgroundThe appeal of Vincent Conti, Investigator, Secured Facilities, removal, effective June 29, 2023, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge R. Tali Epstein (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on August 4, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority and a reply was filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on September 24, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and her recommendation to reverse the removal.

As indicated above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions and finds them unpersuasive and unworthy of extensive comment. In this regard, the ALJ’s recommended reversal was based on her determinations pursuant to the Attorney General (AG) Guidelines for internal investigations and O’Rourke v. City of Lambertville, 405 N.J. Super. 8 (2008). In this regard, the ALJ performed a thorough review of the record and the standards outlined and found the violations of the AG Guidelines during the investigation of this matter were of such magnitude that dismissal of the charges was warranted. Specifically, the ALJ stated:

This is one of those cases where a de novo hearing at the [Office of Administrative Law] OAL cannot cure the deviation from the [AG

Guidelines]. Hamlin’s conflict of interest injected unreliability into the impartiality in the investigatory process that cannot be remedied by a post-hoc plenary hearing before this Tribunal.

She further found that:

A plenary hearing at the OAL will not remedy the flawed investigation process and the compromised evidentiary foundation that led to the charges against Conti and the termination penalty. The

Tribunal cannot reconduct the investigation or verify that Hamlin viewed all of the available video footage from the time the Durango was assigned until the damage was discovered and verify that no one else operated the Durango outside of the days that Hamlin included in the

Investigation Report. Nor can the Tribunal rule out that the Durango may have been vandalized on any of the days that it was stationary, as that finding was not addressed in the Investigation Report. Nor can the

Tribunal test the pieces of plastic that Yannuzzi collected nearly contemporaneously with the date that the damage was reported by

Theodoridis. Stated otherwise, a plenary hearing at the OAL cannot cure the inadequacies of an investigative process that was tainted by

Hamlin’s self-interest in the outcome.

Hamlin’s disqualifying conflict of interest, his focus on including certain video footage and his own exculpatory statements in the

Investigation Report, and his reliance on materials found at the scene that were discarded or photographed a month after the alleged incident and never tested to support the sustained findings of his investigation, inject doubt in the reliability and thoroughness of the investigation that cannot now be remedied. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that

Hamlin’s Investigation Report definitively stated that the red plastic pieces that Yannuzzi discarded were “parts to the Dodge Durango tail light [sic],” and Hamlin made no attempt to test the pieces he recovered from the scene of the alleged impact over a month after the damage was reported to confirm whether they were actual pieces of the Durango taillight. See O’Rourke at 21 (“Moreover, the report the supervisor produced . . . confirm[ed] the court’s suspicion” that the investigator lacked objectivity.)

Administrative Law JudgeThus, I CONCLUDE that the violation of IAPP 4.2.6 tainted the process from its inception. I further CONCLUDE that because the result of the IAPP deviation could not be remedied by a de novo hearing,

AnalysisConti was deprived of a fair investigation, and the charges against him cannot stand.

Upon its de novo review of the record and the ALJ’s analysis, as well as the appointing authority’s exceptions, the Commission agrees that the charges in this matter must be reversed. In this regard, while procedural deficiencies at the departmental level which are not significantly prejudicial to an appellant are generally deemed cured through the de novo hearing received at the OAL per Ensslin v. Township of North Bergen, 275 N.J. Super. 352, 361 (App. Div. 1994), cert. denied, 142 N.J. 446 (1995) and In re Darcy, 114 N.J. Super. 454 (App. Div. 1971), the facts of this matter cannot support that excusal of the procedural violations in this case. In this regard, the Court in O’Rourke, supra at 23, stated:

In summary, we are convinced that when a law enforcement agency adopts rules pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 to implement the

Attorney General's Guidelines, the agency has an obligation to comply with those rules. Because it failed to do so, and because the deficiencies tainted the disciplinary process, the City's decision to remove plaintiff from his position cannot stand. (emphasis added).

Initially, the Commission notes that the O’Rourke matter was decided in a jurisdiction not covered under the Civil Service Act, i.e., Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes. Regardless, where applicable, the Commission believes it should also be applied to Civil Service jurisdictions. A plain reading of the above holding indicates that in order to find that charges should be dismissed, there must be a showing that the deficiencies also tainted the disciplinary process. In this matter, the ALJ found that the violations did, indeed, so taint the process as to not survive the granting of a de novo hearing. The Commission finds nothing in the ALJ’s findings or analysis of this matter to disagree.

Thus, the Commission rejects the appointing authority’s arguments in its exceptions that the ALJ should have decided the matter on the merits of the charges, as per above, it is clear that the charges were properly dismissed based on the tainted investigation. Similarly, whether charges are dismissed procedurally or on the merits, such dismissal entails that such charges were not warranted and no infirmities attached can continue to be ascribed. For example, the appointing authority’s continued concern about the appellant’s veracity is of no concern to the Commission, since, based on the ALJ’s initial decision and the Commission’s affirmance of that decision dismissing the charges, the appellant’s veracity in no longer in question in this particular matter. Whether the appellant’s veracity going forward is at issue is not a question properly before the Commission at this time.

Since the removal has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from the first date of separation without pay until the date of actual reinstatement. Moreover, as the appellant has prevailed, he is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay or counsel fees are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses the removal and grants the appeal of Vincent Conti.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from the appellant’s first date of separation without pay to the actual date of reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that counsel fees be awarded to the attorney for the appellant pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12 the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay or counsel fees. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.