RONALD ARTIS-FONT, CSC Docket No. 2025-2007

BackgroundThe appeal of Ronald Artis-Font, a Police Officer with the City of East Orange, Department of Public Safety, of his 10 working day suspension, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Kimberly K. Holmes (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on February 2, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant. .

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on March 18, 2026, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. However, it did not agree with the ALJ’s recommendation to uphold the 10 working day suspension. Rather, the Commission modified the 10 working day suspension to a five working day suspension.

In his exceptions, the appellant argues that the appointing authority failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to the underlying charges of incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties because it did not establish with competent evidence that he failed to follow departmental policy, t.e., the General Order, by leaving a bicycle in storage at a business where the citizen was arrested instead of transporting and storing the bicycle at a departmental facility. Alternatively, the appellant argues that if the Commission believes a sufficient basis exists to sustain the charges, the penalty should be reduced based upon the appointing authority’s history of deviating from progressive discipline and the fact that the bicycle at issue

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was ultimately recovered from the location where the appellant arranged to have it stored.

Administrative Law JudgeRegarding the charges, the ALJ’s determination was based on her evaluation of the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record and her assessment of the credibility of that evidence. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of

Analysis. Jd.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[{T}rial courts’ credibility findings ... are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an AL.J’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). The Commission finds no persuasive evidence in the record to demonstrate that the ALd’s credibility determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. While the appellant attempts to establish that the appointing authority failed to satisfy its burden of proof, he has not substantiated

| such claims sufficiently to convince the Commission that the due deference normally afforded to an ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should be ignored. Accordingly, the Commission, upon its de novo review of the record, agrees with the ALJ’s assessment of the charges and affirms it.

Regarding the penalty, similar to its review of the underlying charge, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the

_ Imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Moreover, the Commission emphasizes that a Police Officer is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.dJ. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).

In this matter, the Commission finds reason to reduce the penalty from a 10 working day suspension to a five working day suspension. The ALJ recommended that the appointing authority’s 10 working day suspension of the appellant be sustained based upon the nature of the charges, i.e., his failure to take a citizen’s bicycle into custody after making an arrest or to otherwise make alternative arrangements to transport it for storage at departmental headquarters in accordance with departmental policy, as well as the appellant’s prior disciplinary history which was set forth in the ALJ’s initial decision. The Commission agrees with the ALJ that the nature of the charges and the appellant’s disciplinary history support the imposition of a suspension. However, it does not agree that a 10 working day suspension is the proper penalty. The ALJ noted that one of the appointing authority’s witnesses, who led the unit responsible for investigating the appellant’s conduct, testified that the appellant’s body worn camera footage showed that he asked other Police Officers at the scene if the bicycle could fit into their vehicles and

_ that the appellant decided to leave it at the business only after the other officers advised the appellant that they were also unable to transport the bicycle. Thus, it is evident that the appellant made some effort to arrange for the bicycle to be transported to police headquarters and to seek the counsel of other officers who would have been under the same obligation to understand applicable departmental policies and procedures. Moreover, the bicycle was ultimately recovered from the location where the appellant arranged to have it stored. Nevertheless, the foregoing does not fully excuse the appellant’s failure to adhere to the appointing authority’s policy regarding evidence and property control and disposition, which specifically address recovered bicycles, particularly as that failure delayed the return of the bicycle to the citizen and required the department to utilize additional personnel and resources to facilitate the recovery of said property. Accordingly, while the Commission is in no way minimizing the appellant’s failure in this instance, it finds that a five working day suspension should serve as more than sufficient notice to the appellant that any future issues concerning his ability to adhere to departmental procedures and perform his duties could result in more severe discipline.

Since the appellant’s suspension has been modified, the appellant is entitled to five working days of back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.Jj.A.C. 4A:2- 2.10. However, he is not entitled to counsel fees. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary . issue in the disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). In the case at hand, although the penalty was modified by the

Commission, the charges were sustained, and discipline was imposed. Consequently, as the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12, counsel fees must be denied.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in suspending the appellant was justified. However, it modifies the 10 working day suspension of the appellant to a five working day suspension.

The Commission further orders that the appellant be granted five working days of backpay, benefits, and seniority as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. Counsel fees are denied.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.