K.B., CSC Docket No. 2025-2016

BackgroundThe appeal of K.B., a Police Officer with the City of Newark, Department of Public Safety, of his 15 working day suspension, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Patrice E. Hobbs (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on March 23, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority, and a reply to exceptions was filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached ALjJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply filed by the parties, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on April 29, 2026, adopted the ALwJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and her recommendation to reverse the 15 working day suspension.

As mentioned above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed in this matter and finds them unpersuasive. In this regard, the ALJ’s determinations are predominantly based on her assessment of the credible evidence in the record. Significantly, the central issue in this matter was whether the appellant made any false statement or omission about his expunged criminal record on his June 8, 2019 application for employment as a Police Officer with the appointing authority and/or on a May 25, 2024 application for employment with the Rutgers University Police Department (RUPD). In particular, the appointing authority pointed to the appellant answering “no” to a question on its application about whether he ever had a restraining order issued against him and “no” to questions on both the appointing authority's and RUPD’s applications about having ever been arrested for domestic violence, while providing details of his arrest and expungement in other sections of each application. In addition, the appointing authority relied upon Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff's Office, 194 N.J. 563 (2008) as further evidence that the appellant failed to satisfy his disclosure obligations with respect to his expungement records.! In concluding that the appellant did not make a false statement or omission on the appointing authority’s application, the ALJ indicated, in relevant part:

In 2008, {K.B.] was arrested and charged with a violation of criminal law. The arrest stemmed from a domestic violence dispute. A temporary restraining order was issued and dismissed for lack of prosecution. In

2011, [K.B.] had his entire criminal history expunged. In 2019, [K.B.]

applied for employment with respondent. On that application, [K.B.]

responded that he had never had a restraining order issued against him.

The [temporary restraining order] that was issued was dismissed.

Under the applicable regulations [sic], [K.B.] responded truthfully to that question. N.J.A.C. 2C:52-27 [sic]? states that the arrest, conviction and proceedings related to a criminal charge that has been expunged can be denied. That regulation [sic] also requires that if the individual seeks employment with a law enforcement agency, the expungement must be disclosed. [K.B.] complied. He disclosed the expungement to respondent. [K.B.] did not hide any of his arrests, lie about any of his arrests, or deny that the arrests occurred. [K.B.] did not make any false statements concerning his arrests or the expungement. Respondent did its own due diligence on his criminal history and obtained the information independently. The respondent’s background investigation contained all the same information [K.B.] disclosed in his application.

Respondent was aware of the expungement when they reviewed and approved his application. There were no omissions or false statements.

Similarly, with respect to the appellant’s answer of “no” to the domestic violence question on the RUPD application, the ALJ found that the appellant’s answer was permissible based upon N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27 and that he otherwise fulfilled his disclosure obligations to the RUPD with respect to his criminal history and expungement. As to the appointing authority’s reliance on Cicchetti, supra, the ALJ observed that:

First, unlike Cicchetti, respondent is not seeking to terminate [K.B.] and is not alleging that they would not have hired him if they had known about his domestic violence charge. Respondent is seeking discipline for an alleged false answer on applications. Second, and more importantly,

1 The appointing authority’s exceptions reiterate its position that Cicchetti, supra, supports its contention that the appellant failed to satisfy his disclosure obligations and that the foregoing supports the charges at issue. 2 It is noted that the correct citation for the applicable expungement statute is N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27.

Cicchetti did not disclose the expunged record. [K.B.] did disclose the expungement. Third, Morris County had no knowledge of any of

Cicchetti’s arrests.

(Emphasis in original).

Administrative Law JudgeRegarding this third point, the ALJ noted that the appointing authority, in contrast, had the benefit of the appellant’s disclosure of his arrest and expungement when it performed a background check before hiring the appellant. Based upon the totality of these factors, the ALJ found Cicchetti, supra, was inapplicable to the facts at issue in the instant matter.

Concerning the charges, the ALJ’s determinations were based on her assessment of the credibility of the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record and her assessment of the credibility of that evidence. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). Upon its review and notwithstanding the appointing authority’s arguments in the exceptions, the Commission finds no persuasive evidence in the record or the exceptions to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions based predominantly on the above determinations were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the charges were properly dismissed and the appellant’s 15 working day suspension should be reversed.

AnalysisSince the suspension has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to 15 working days of back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Moreover, the appellant is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay and counsel fees are finally resolved.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in suspending the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses that action and grants the appeal of K.B.

The Commission further orders that the appellant be granted 15 working days of back pay, benefits, and seniority. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10(d)3. The Commission also orders reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a). Proof of income earned, and an affidavit in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12, the parties shall make _ a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay or counsel fees.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.