Nicholas Zatkos, CSC Docket No. 2025-2312

BackgroundThe appeal of Nicholas Zatkos, Senior Correctional Police Officer, Youth Justice Commission, removal, effective April 3, 2025, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Allison Friedman (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on October 23, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on November 26, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions, however it did not adopt her recommendation to modify the removal to a 30 working day suspension. Rather, the Commission imposed a 60 working day suspension.

Administrative Law JudgeIn this matter, the ALJ found that the appellant was guilty only of one of the three main infractions alleged. Specifically, the ALJ determined that:

Zatkos is accused of falsification in three different respects. The first allegation is that he added false information to the previously approved FMLA request for 2023. Here, however, the information

AnalysisZatkos added was not untrue, was not a misstatement of material fact, and did not alter the doctor’s information or intent of the leave request.

Administrative Law JudgeRather Zatkos added dates consistent with and further defined the information provided by the doctor. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that

AnalysisZatkos did not commit falsification, conduct unbecoming, or other just cause as defined by YJC policy by adding false information to the previously approved FMLA request for 2023.

Administrative Law JudgeThe second accusation is that Zatkos falsified the 2024 FMLA application. Just as with the 2023 submission, the dates and checkmarks that were added by Zatkos were not misstatements of material fact, nor did the additions alter the meaning or intent of the information supplied by the doctor. Essentially, Zatkos handed in forms that were not completed correctly but were accurate and consistent with the information the doctor had supplied. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that

AnalysisZatkos did not commit falsification, conduct unbecoming, or other just cause as defined by YJC policy by adding dates to the 2024 FMLA submission.

The third falsification accusation is that Zatkos made misstatements to Armstrong during the investigation and processing of only the 2024 FMLA request. In this instance, in an April 12, 2024, email, Zatkos asserted that the doctor’s office faxed the originals and that he personally was dropping off a set of originals. Armstrong never received them. Not only did the doctor’s office denied faxing them the office did fax Armstrong a copy that were different from what Zatkos had provided. The email Zatkos sent on April 12, 2024, was a misstatement of material fact. Additionally, this misstatement of material fact impeded the processing of his leave request and

Armstrong’s investigation into the discrepancies she saw. Therefore, I

CONCLUDE that Zatkos violated the YJC’s falsification and conduct unbecoming policies, constituting violations of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) and 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).

In its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that the appellant intentionally submitted FMLA packets that were not completed by his physician for the dates in question. It contends that the appellant used copies of FMLA forms previously completed by his physician, altered the dates, and checked off additional boxes that the physician did not check off on the forms previously completed. These forms were submitted as representing that the documents were actually completed by his physician. However, as found by the ALJ, the credible evidence in the record establishes only that the appellant added accurate information to the forms in question which was consistent with the physician’s originally supplied information. In essence, the ALJ found that the appellant handed “in forms that were not completed correctly but were accurate and consistent with the information the doctor had supplied” and she could not therefore conclude that the proffered charges were established. In its de novo review, the Commission finds nothing in the record or the appointing authority’s exceptions establishing that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions in that regard are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

Regarding the penalty, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the

Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Even when a law enforcement officer does not possess a prior disciplinary record after many unblemished years of employment, the seriousness of an offense may nevertheless warrant the penalty of removal where it is likely to undermine the public trust. In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that a Senior Correctional Police Officer is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).

Administrative Law JudgeIn this matter, the ALJ, based on the upheld misconduct, recommended modifying the removal to a 30 working day suspension. In this regard, the ALJ stated:

Here, I am permitted to consider the January 16, 2024, discipline that is currently a contested case when determining progressive discipline. First, this discipline is currently on appeal in the Office of

AnalysisAdministrative Law as a contested case, and the facts have not been decided. Second, the two occurred close in time to the instant matter and around the same time as the 2024 forms were due. One of the purposes of progressive discipline is to provide the employee with the opportunity to learn from their wrong and improve. Third, this is Zatkos’ first disciplinary charge in fourteen years of service. Fourth, for a first disciplinary charge, a ninety-day suspension was ordered rather than a letter of reprimand, which is the lowest discipline available for those charges. The other disciplinary charge occurred after the first but prior to the instant case, and for that, despite being the second disciplinary action, Zatkos received the lowest level of discipline. All three of these occurred in 2024, not providing Zatkos with any meaningful time to correct or learn from the discipline. Thus, I assign minimal weight to this disciplinary matter in consideration of progressive discipline.

I also consider the testimony of Zatkos. During the hearing, he acknowledged what he did and that the procedure his doctor created to complete the FMLA forms was not proper. For fourteen years without an issue Zatkos had applied and approved for FMLA, this was the first time. He was remorseful for his actions and honest in his desire not to repeat them. Zatkos’ desire to maintain his position so that he may be able to make a positive impact on other juveniles is a strong motivation to correct his actions and continue to be an asset to the YJC for another fourteen years. Compelling is the fact the information added to the

FMLA forms was not false and did not alter the information completed by the doctors. Along with the fact Zatkos’s only benefit he sought by misleading Armstrong was one less trip to the doctor’s office. In addition to his very limited disciplinary record for fourteen years of employment and his acknowledgement and ability to correct his actions, I

CONCLUDE that for the sustained charges of falsification and conduct unbecoming an officer, a period of suspension is the appropriate level of discipline.

While the appointing authority believes the removal should be upheld, for all of the reasons expressed by the ALJ above, the Commission can support the modification to a penalty less than removal. However, the ALJ clearly minimized the appellant’s misconduct as well as did not sufficiently take into account the recent 90 working day suspension on the appellant’s record. In that regard, the tenets of progressive discipline support a penalty more significant than a 30 working day suspension. Accordingly, the Commission finds that a 60 working day suspension is the appropriate penalty. That penalty should serve as sufficient warning to the appellant that any future misconduct with likely result in his removal from employment.

Since the removal has been modified, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated to his position with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from 60 working days after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay1 until the date he is reinstated.

However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in a disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). Thus, where, as here, a penalty is modified but charges are sustained and major discipline is imposed, counsel fees must be denied since the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

1 In this regard, if the appellant was immediately suspended without pay prior to the effective date of his removal, the imposed six-month day suspension begins as of that date, and the back pay period starts six months later. See e.g. In the Matter of Ranique Woodson (CSC, decided January 15, 2025).

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore modifies that action to a 60 working day suspension.

Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from 60 working days after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is reinstated. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.