Sherene Gray, CSC Docket No. 2025-2734

BackgroundThe appeal of Sherene Gray, a Nurse’ Aide with Passaic County, Preakness Healthcare Center, of her removal, effective May 12, 2025, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Joann LaSala Candido (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on January 12, 2026.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached AL.J’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of February 4, 2026, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the AlLJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to uphold the removal.

As indicated above, the Commission thoroughly reviewed the ALJ’s initial decision and the record in this matter. Upon that review, there is no evidence in the record that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions or her recommendation to uphold the removal were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Commission upholds those actions for the reasons expressed by the ALJ. It makes only the following comments regarding the penalty and Last Chance Agreements.

In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry vu. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.-J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.-J. 474 (2007).

The Commission notes that the use of a Last Chance Agreement is solely for the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty. While the Office of Administrative Law and the Commission are not strictly bound by the terms set forth in the agreement, since neither entity was a party to the settlement, the Commission is nonetheless cognizant of the fact that the parties in this matter voluntarily agreed to the penalty of removal for any subsequent violation. Consequently, a Last Chance Agreement can be used by the Commission as a significant factor to be considered, along with the appellant’s prior disciplinary history, when determining the appropriate penalty in an appeal. Additionally, Last Chance Agreements are construed in favor of appointing authorities because to do otherwise would discourage their use by making their terms meaningless. See Watson v. City of East Orange, 175 N.-J. 442 (2003) (The Supreme Court found an employee’s termination was warranted when that employee did not perform in compliance with a Last Chance Agreement as contemplated by the parties. The Court added that a contrary conclusion would likely chill employers from entering into such agreements to the detriment of future employees.); In the Matter of Phillip Montgomery (MSB, decided May 9, 2000) (In denying a request for reconsideration of an employee’s removal, it was indicated that in addition to the employee’s extensive history of infractions and the concept of progressive discipline, it gave significant weight to the fact that the employee signed an agreement acknowledging that further instances of certain infractions would result in further disciplinary action up to and including removal).

In the instant matter, there is indisputable evidence that, after entering into a Last Chance Agreement on September 10, 2024, the appellant was absent on multiple occasions, exhausting her sick leave by February 2025. The ALJ also found that the appellant “clearly and continually violated the policy regarding chronic, habitual, excessive absenteeism and lateness.” An employer, especially in a healthcare facility, has the legitimate right to expect that its employees will attend work when scheduled and the appellant chronically failed to do so. Accordingly, the charges against the appellant are sustained and her removal is upheld.

ORDER

The Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore affirms that action and dismisses the appeal of Sherene Gray.

ClosingThis is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.