A.O., CSC Docket No. 2025-2796

BackgroundThe appeal of A.O., a Human Services Assistant with the Department of Human Services, Hunterdon Developmental Center, of his removal, effective March 25, 2025, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Allison Friedman (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on May 18, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority and a reply to exceptions was filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on July 1, 2026, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the attached ALJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to reverse the removal.

In its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing the charges against A.O. and reversing the penalty of removal because the video footage in the record evidenced that A.O.’s conduct constituted abuse under departmental policies and the underlying circumstances did not otherwise constitute an emergency situation that otherwise excused or justified A.O.’s actions.

As indicated above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed by the appointing authority in this matter and finds them unpersuasive. The ALJ’s initial decision was well-reasoned and her findings and conclusions were based predominately on her assessment of the credible evidence in the record, including video footage of the incident. The Commission wholly agrees with the ALJ’s analysis of the charges. Notably, the ALJ ultimately found:

[W]hen human services specialists position themselves at either side of a client, with “each person grabbing a side of the patient under the armpit, a light lift of the patient with their buttock off the ground a little bit, and pulling the patient by the armpits,” the technique is best described as a “fireman’s carry” and not a drag. Pendergrass v. Dept. of

Human Servs., CSV 7328-98, Initial Decision (March 20, 2000), adopted,

[(MSB, decided July 25, 2000)].

In this case, [A.O.] placed his hand under M.T.’s armpit and his arm under M.T.’s arm, as [another employee] did the same on the other side of M.T. while under the watchful eye and direction of their supervisor.

Together, they gently raised M.T.’s buttocks from the floor and scooted him into the secure living space. The technique had not been taught to them in training[,] but did not cause any physical or psychological injury to M.T.

The escort is consistent with a “fireman’s carry.” [A.O.] did not drag or push M.T. [A.O.’s] actions and decisions were based on his knowledge of

M.T.’s impulsive, defiant, cunning, and sometimes violent behaviors, as seen in the video and documented in the [behavioral support plan (BSP)].

Here, similar to a Fireman’s need for that type of carry, the circumstances were exigent. Based on his prior knowledge that is well documented in M.T.’s BSP[, A.O.] had good reason to believe M.T. would, without warning, try to elope, creating a risk of injury to both M.T. and

[A.O.]. Further, [A.O.] used the least invasive lift or escort to move M.T.

to a safe location removing the threat of danger.

The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). In this matter, the exceptions filed are not persuasive in demonstrating that the ALJ’s determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. As such, the Commission has no reason to question those determinations, or the findings and conclusions made therefrom. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the charges were properly dismissed and the appellant’s removal should be reversed.

Since the removal has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from the first date of separation without pay until the date of actual reinstatement. Moreover, as the appellant has prevailed, he is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses the removal and grants the appeal of A.O.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from the appellant’s first date of separation without pay to the actual date of reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that counsel fees be awarded to the attorney for the appellant pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12 the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay or counsel fees. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay or counsel fees dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.