Chase Potocny, CSC Docket No. 2025-922

BackgroundThe appeal of Chase Potocny, Police Officer, Bordentown, Police Department, removal, effective May 15, 2024, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tricia M. Caliguire (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on August 14, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant and the appointing authority and a reply was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on September 24, 2025, adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions and her recommendation to modify the removal to a six-month suspension with additional training.

Administrative Law JudgeIn this matter, the ALJ found that the appellant was guilty of many of the infractions alleged. Upon its de novo review of the ALJ’s determinations in that regard, and notwithstanding the appellant’s arguments in his exceptions to the contrary, the Commission agrees with the ALJ’s findings and finds nothing in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings regarding the charges that were sustained and reversed were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

AnalysisIn its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that removal is the proper penalty in this matter and that the ALJ should not have relied on a Lieutenant’s testimony that removal would not have been recommended if the appellant had not been untruthful in his interview. In this regard, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Even when a law enforcement officer does not possess a prior disciplinary record after many unblemished years of employment, the seriousness of an offense may nevertheless warrant the penalty of removal where it is likely to undermine the public trust. In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that a municipal Police Officer is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).

Administrative Law JudgeIn this matter, the ALJ performed an analysis of the penalty to be imposed. In that regard, the ALJ stated:

As respondent notes, Potocny’s prior disciplinary record is clean of infractions involving truthfulness, but does include a violation for engaging in a high-speed chase and ignoring traffic devices. Resp’t’s

AnalysisPost-Hr’g Br. (July 3, 2025) (Resp’t’s Br.), at 36, citing R-191. The absence of prior discipline may be disregarded if the “seriousness of an offense . . . warrants” termination. Resp’t’s Br. at 34 (citations omitted).

Law enforcement officers must be held to a high standard in their job performance and in the context of disciplinary removals. What gives me pause, however, is that Pavlov testified that he and Chief Roohr would not have recommended termination if Potocny had admitted his mistake and accepted accountability, but because Potocny was not truthful in the IA interview, they had no choice but to seek the greater penalty. Potocny did admit to making a mistake—multiple times.

“Accountability” generally means dealing with the consequences, making up for what you did wrong. There was no testimony or evidence on how Potocny could have made this digression right, whether to contact the complainants to correct the record or to serve a lesser penalty, including training. Given that I am unable to find that Potocny lied during his IA interview, I am left with respondent’s position that

Potocny’s conduct on March 26, 2024, alone does not rise to the level of termination. (footnote omitted). Accordingly, I recommend, for the reasons described above, that the penalty sought in this matter be modified to a six-month suspension followed by training in dealing with the public.

1 The disciplinary action taken for that incident in 2023 was a written reprimand.

While the appointing authority believes the removal should be upheld, for all of the reasons expressed by the ALJ above, the Commission can support the modification to a six-month suspension with additional training. That penalty, the most severe suspension permitted under Civil Service law and rules, should serve as a warning to the appellant that any future misconduct with likely result in his removal from employment. In making this determination, the Commission affords no weight to the Lieutenant’s testimony regarding the appropriate penalty. Rather, the Commission’s determination is based solely on its assessment of the nature and severity of the upheld charges, which it does not find sufficient in this matter to warrant removal.

Since the removal has been modified, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated to his position with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from six-months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay2 until the date he is reinstated.

However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in a disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). Thus, where, as here, a penalty is modified but charges are sustained and major discipline is imposed, counsel fees must be denied since the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

2 In this regard, if the appellant was immediately suspended without pay prior to the effective date of his removal, the imposed six-month suspension begins as of that date, and the back pay period starts six months later. See e.g. In the Matter of Ranique Woodson (CSC, decided January 15, 2025).

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore modifies that action to a six-month suspension. The Commission further orders that the appellant undergo additional training as specified in the initial decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from six-months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is reinstated. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.