Jonathan Scotto- ; DECISION OF THE Department of Corrections, CSC Docket No. 2026-236

BackgroundThe appeal of Jonathan Scotto-Difrega, a County Correctional Police Officer with Monmouth County, Department of Corrections, of his removal, effective June 19, 2025, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sarah G. Crowley, who rendered her initial decision on November 12, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the AL.J’s initial decision, including a thorough review of the exceptions, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of December 17, 2025, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the attached ALJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to reverse the removal.

As indicated above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed by the appointing authority in this matter and finds them unpersuasive. In this regard, the ALJ’s determinations are predominantly based on her assessment of the credible evidence in the record. In this regard, while the ALJ did not make explicit credibility determinations, it is clear that she found the appellant’s testimony credible, and that no other evidence in the record substantially contradicted that testimony. The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.-/. 108 (1997). “(Tjrial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 Niel. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurio, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Jd. at 659 {citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.dJ. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). In this matter, the exceptions filed are not persuasive in demonstrating that the ALJ’s determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. As such, the Commission has no reason to question those determinations, or the findings and conclusions made therefrom.

The Commission otherwise also agrees with the ALJ’s analysis of the charges. In this regard, the ALJ ultimately found:

The County relies on the issuance of the October 8, 2024, FRO [Final Restraining Order] in support of their disciplinary charge of Conduct Unbecoming. The respondent argues that the Order represents a finding of a violation of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, which constitutes conduct unbecoming. The respondent conducted no investigation, did not interview any witnesses, or investigate the basis for the vacation of the FRO one month later. There is some reference as to a potential appeal of the initial restraining Order which became moot when the Order was vacated in November 2024. The FRO was based on allegations of harassment which occurred off duty and in the middle of a very contentious divorce. There was no evidence of a “pattern of conduct” and no prior discipline relating to similar misconduct by the appellant. The initial suspension of the appellant imposing a six-month suspension as a result of the October 8, 2024, FRO specifically stated that “any subsequent conduct could result in stronger disciplinary charge being recommended, up to recommending your separation of employment with the County of Monmouth.” It is undisputed that no further misconduct occurred. There was no investigation into the underlying conduct, and the restraining order was vacated.

Administrative Law JudgeThe undersigned does not in any way imply that the finding of a violation of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act is not a very serious matter and should not be taken lightly. However, the respondent made no effort to investigate the circumstances surrounding the initial finding, or the circumstances which resulted in it being dismissed and vacated one month later. Moreover, they suspended the appellant for a period not to exceed six months and specifically stated in that disciplinary notice that “any other conduct could result in more serious charges.” The six-month suspension was served, his license was restored by the PTC [Police Training Commission] and no other conduct occurred. Accordingly, I conclude that the respondent has failed to prove conduct unbecoming by the preponderance of the credible evidence.

AnalysisUpon its de nove review, the Commission finds nothing in the record or the exceptions demonstrating that this finding was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

Since the removal has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from the first date of separation without pay when he was eligible to return to work! until the date of actual reinstatement. Moreover, as the appellant has prevailed, he is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay or counsel fees are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses the removal and grants the appeAl of Jonathan Scotto-DiFrega.

The Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from the appellant’s first date of separation without pay when he was eligible to return to work to the actual date of reinstatement. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that counsel fees be awarded to the attorney for the appellant pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Analysis1 In this regard, although the removal date was June 19, 2025, if the appellant was immediately suspended without pay prior to the effective date of his removal, the back pay period starts as of that date. See e.g. In the Matter of Ranique Woodson (CSC, decided January 15, 2025). A review of the Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action in the record indicates an immediate suspension effective April 29, 2025. However, it does not indicate whether said suspension was with or without pay. Moreover, as indicated by the ALJ, back pay shall be limited to the time when the appellant was eligible to return to work. Thus, according to the record, the PTC reinstated the appellant’s law enforcement license effective April 24, 2025. The appellant had been serving up to a six-month suspension prior to that time. Accordingly, the award of mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to Nid.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 shall commence on April 24, 2025, until the date of the appellant’s actual reinstatement.

OrderPursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 and N.dJA.C. 4A:2-2.12 the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay or counsel fees. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay or counsel fees dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-8(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.