Christopher Massey, CSC Docket No. 2025-2220

BackgroundThe appeals of Christopher Massey, a Deputy Police Chief with the Borough of Bergenfield, Police Department, of his 10 and 60 working day suspensions, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Bindi Merchant (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on May 28, 2026.1 Exceptions were filed by the appointing authority and a reply was filed by the appellant.2

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply filed by the parties, the Civil Service Commission (Commission) at its meeting of July 1, 2026, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as contained in the ALJ’s initial decision and her recommendation to dismiss the charges related to the 10 and 60 working day suspensions as having violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.

Administrative Law Judge1 In her initial decision the ALJ also ordered that an appeal (CSC Docket No. 2025-167) of a third suspension, of 45 working days, be scheduled for a hearing as there was no violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 for those charges. These matters have been bifurcated, and separate decisions are being issued as the appeal of the 45 working day suspension is being remanded to the Office of Administrative Law. See In the Matter of Christopher Massey, Borough of Bergenfield, Police Department (CSC, decided July 1, 2026) (Commission ordered a remand for a hearing on charges related to the appellant’s 45 working day suspension to be scheduled). 2 The suspensions were not served.

AnalysisInitially, the Commission does not agree with the appointing authority’s exceptions that argue that the appellant waived his right to assert a violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. In this regard, the ALJ found:

Here, [the appointing authority] argues that [the appellant] has not timely raised the forty-five-day rule. [The appointing authority] argues that [the appellant] should have raised the forty-five-day rule either at the time of the charges, upon receipt of disposition letters, when he requested a hearing, or by seeking interim relief. Instead, [the appellant] raised the forty-five-day rule in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 in his motion for summary decision. Since the “forty-five-day” rule is considered analogous to the statute of limitations, [the appellant] has not waived the forty-five-day rule as he has brought this affirmative defense in his motion for summary decision.

Furthermore, regarding the testimony of the parties and the ALJ’s assessment of their credibility in determining the facts, the Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri v. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). The Commission finds no persuasive evidence in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ’s credibility determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Commission finds nothing in the record to question those determinations or the findings and conclusions made therefrom.

Moreover, the Commission agrees with the ALJ’s analysis with respect to each suspension. Regarding the 10 working day suspension, the ALJ found:

[The appointing authority] argues that Chief Rabboh did not possess sufficient information to determine the appropriate disciplinary penalty and sought an independent recommendation from Judge Klein. Case law indicates that the forty-five-day rule starts when the person filing the complaint has sufficient notice of the conduct underlying the disciplinary charges, not regarding the penalty. Chief Rabboh was able to sustain the complaint on January 18, 2024, and a PNDA should have been issued within forty-five days after. If he wanted to wait for Judge

Klein’s recommendations on penalty, he could have issued the PNDA with “TBD” written for the penalty portion or even left the penalty blank. Instead, the PNDA was served on May 31, 2024. Therefore, the forty-five-day rule was violated, and the ten-day suspension is dismissed for untimeliness under the statute.

Administrative Law JudgeRegarding the 60 working day suspension, the ALJ found:

There is no current case law that explicitly states whether the forty-five- day rule applies to the [Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policy and

AnalysisProcedures (IAPP)]. As the name suggests, these are

“guidelines,” not statutory violations but more aligned with policy violations, similar to internal departmental policies. The forty-five-day rules only apply to “charges of violations of departmental rules and regulations.” [In the Matter of Telina Hairston, City of East Orange (CSC, decided February 8, 2017)]. See also McElwee, 400 N.J. Super. at

394. Thus, the forty-five-day rule would apply to the AG Guidelines.

Additionally, as persuasively argued by the appellant in his reply, the IAPP govern agency conduct. The appellant also highlights that the appointing authority adopted the IAPP guidelines via a general order, which is part of the Police Department Policy and Procedure, and Chief Rabboh acknowledged this.

Finally, it is noted that the appellant, in his reply, requests an award of reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred in defending against disciplinary charges that were commenced in violation of the mandatory filing requirements of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. The Commission agrees that, under the circumstances, the appellant should receive this relief. Therefore, since the 10 and 60 working day suspensions have been dismissed, the appellant is entitled to reasonable counsel fees only for these dismissed suspensions pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. The Commission notes, however, under no circumstances should counsel fees for these two matters exceed two-thirds of the total counsel fees for all three matters (i.e., the 45, 10, and 60 working day suspensions) incurred up to the issuance of this decision.

This decision resolves the dispute between the parties concerning the 10 and 60 working day suspensions imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision with respect to these two suspensions will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning counsel fees are finally resolved.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the actions of the appointing authority in imposing the 10 and 60 working day suspensions were in violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 and dismisses these charges.

The Commission also orders reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. However, under no circumstances should counsel fees for these matters exceed two-thirds of the total counsel fees for all three matters incurred up to the issuance of this decision.

An affidavit in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of counsel fees.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of these matters shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.