Stacey Williams, CSC Docket No. 2025-91, 2025-92

BackgroundThe appeals of Stacey Williams, Police Chief, Roselle Police Department, two removals, effective March 14, 2024, on charges, were heard by Administrative Law Judge Thomas R. Betancourt (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on May 8, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority! and a reply was filed on behalf of the appellant.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions and reply, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on June 11, 2025, accepted and adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions and his recommendations to reverse one removal and modify one removal to a 30 working day suspension.

1} Tt is noted that along with the exceptions filed on behalf of the appointing authority, both the Mayor of Roselle, and the President of the Roselle PBA submitted their “objections” to the ALJ’s decision. However, as the Roselle PBA is not a party to the appeals filed by the appellant, that submission cannot be considered as “exceptions” to the consolidated initial decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, which only permits parties to a matter to file exceptions or replies. Moreover, while the Mayor is the appointing authority for Roselle, it is officially represented in this matter by Tyler Newman, Esq., and, thus, the Mayor’s ex parte submission cannot be substantively considered by the Commission. Only the exceptions properly filed on Roselle’s behalf by its representative were considered. Regardless, both the Mayor’s and President’s submissions have been included as part of the underlying file for informational purposes should this matter be challenged further.

Removal 1

The first removal involved allegations that the appellant improperly ordered officers to work out-of-title overtime duties; and subsequently ceased all “off-duty- jobs” for the department which resulted in additional costs. In this matter, the ALJ found that the appointing authority had not sustained its burden of proof on the underlying charges. In its exceptions, the appointing authority does not challenge the ALJ’s determinations in that regard. Upon its de novo review, the Commission finds nothing in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and determinations in that regard were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or otherwise not based on the credible evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Commission affirms the reversal of the removal predicated on the charges relating to the alleged performance-related misconduct.

Removal 2

Regarding the removal for the appellant’s use of inappropriate language, there does not appear to be any material substantive dispute about the misconduct. Indeed, the appellant essentially admitted to the language alleged.

In its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that the ALJ improperly dismissed the charges of violation under N./.A.C. 4A:7-3.1, which is the State Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace (State Policy). Initially, the Commission notes that any such charges were improperly proffered. The State Policy explicitly only applies to State employees. Local government employees are not subject to the State Policy. As such, the appellant should have been charged under N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.2(a)9, Discrimination that affects equal employment opportunity (as defined in N..-J.A.C. 4A:7-1.1), including sexual harassment or under any other similar policy established by the appointing authority. See N.J.A.C. 4A:7-1.1(g). Regardless, even if properly charged, it is clear that the appellant's comment, in the context described was not intended to effect equal employment opportunity or otherwise directed toward any specific employee. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, the appellant's comment was found to be discriminatory, it was also found to be conduct unbecoming a public employee. Thus, such a finding would only be germane to the proper penalty to be imposed, which, for the reasons discussed below, the Commission agrees with the 30 working day suspension recommended by the ALJ.

Administrative Law JudgeRegarding the penalty, in the initial decision, the ALJ found:

AnalysisIn the instant matter, appellant has limited prior discipline which is quite remote in time. Indeed, one can infer appellant would not have risen to Chief of Police with any substantial disciplinary background. I so infer.

Still, discipline is warranted for the use of the offensive term by appellant while on duty and in police headquarters.

Appellant used the offending word while referring to a personal friend who is gay. It was not used as a pejorative term and was not directed at any individual. It was not used to demean anyone. It was inappropriate for the Chief of Police to use any offensive language, particularly while on duty and in police headquarters.

Administrative Law JudgeI CONCLUDE that the respondent has proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that appellant was guilty of the sustained charges as noted above in the “Conduct” Final Notice of

AnalysisDisciplinary Action; and, that the appropriate discipline for the same is a thirty day suspension.

The Commission agrees with the ALJ’s assessment. In this regard, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant's offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 Nd. AR. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry uv. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it 1s recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Moreover, the Commission emphasizes that a municipal Police Officer is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.-F. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).

In this matter, the Commission finds that, while abhorrent, the appellant’s inappropriate and offensive language, given the context, is not so egregious to warrant removal from employment absent an application of progressive discipline. In this matter, as indicated by the ALJ, the appellant had a long career without a significant disciplinary history. Further, while the appellant’s actions, as a Police Chief, are clearly inappropriate, the Commission cannot find that, given his long tenure and lack of a significant disciplinary history, removal is warranted, even acknowledging that Police Officers, and in this case, the highest ranking officer, are held to a higher standing. However, the Commission emphasizes that its modification of the penalty is in no way condoning the appellant’s misconduct. Indeed, the 30 working day suspension imposed, a weighty penalty, should serve to impress upon the appellant the gravity of his actions as well as serve as a clear warning that any further inappropriate conduct may lead to more severe disciplinary action, up to removal from employment.

Remedies

Since Removal 1 has been reversed and Removal 2 has been modified, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated to his position with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from 30 working days after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay until the date he is reinstated.

Further, since Removal 1 has been reversed, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 2-2.12, the appellant’s attorney is entitled to reasonable counsel fees. However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees for Removal 2. N.d.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in a disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). Thus, where, as here, a penalty is modified but charges are sustained and major discipline is imposed, counsel fees must be denied since the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. Accordingly, as this matter involved the appeal of two removals, where only one has been reversed, the Commission finds that the appellant is only entitled to 50% of the total amount of counsel fees expended for both matters.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning Removal 1 and the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning Removal 2 and the penalty imposed therein. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. February 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision on Removal 1 will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning counsel fees are finally resolved and on Removal 2 will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

Removal 1

The Civil Service Commission finds that the appointing authority’s action in removing the appellant was not justified. Therefore, the Commission reverses that action and upholds the appeal of Stacey Williams. The Commission further awards reasonable counsel fees as provided for in N.e/.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. However, as indicated above, this award is to be 50% of the total amount of counsel fees expended for both appealed matters.

An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. The Commission directs that the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of counsel fees.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there 1s any dispute as to counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter should be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Removal 2

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Civil Service Commission therefore modifies Removal 2 to a 30 working day suspension.

Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from 30 working days after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is reinstated. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.e/.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.