In the Matter of Eugene Vick, Northern State Prison, Department of Corrections, CSC Docket No. 2025-66, 2025-2137

NJ Civil Service Commission decision of September 23, 2026, CSC Docket No. 2025-66: discipline, penalty modified. Eugene Vick, a Senior Correctional Police Officer, with the Department of Corrections, Northern State Prison, appeals his two removals, effective June 20, 2024 and March 31, 2025, on cha

Eugene Vick, a Senior Correctional Police Officer, with the Department of Corrections, Northern State Prison, appeals his two removals, effective June 20, 2024 and March 31, 2025, on charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee, and other sufficient cause.

Matter
Discipline
Outcome
Penalty modified
Decided
September 23, 2026, item A-2
More case detailsAdditional facts from the record
ALJ's recommendation
Modify the June 20, 2024 removal to a six month suspension and reverse the March 31, 2025 removal.
What the Commission did with it
Adopted the ALJ's recommendation
Penalty after the decision
removal
Title
SENIOR CORRECTIONAL POLICE OFFICER
Employer
Corrections
Department
Department of Corrections on Police Transparency NJ
Chair at the time
Mary Cruz, Acting Chairperson

Action recorded in the minutes

The Civil Service Commission affirmed the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge and recommended anger management.

Key passage

Quoted from the decision.

Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from six months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is reinstated.

In context

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

In context

Issues

Our classification of the matter, from the minutes and the rules the decision cites.

The decision

The attached ALJ initial decision is not reproduced here. Open the official PDF for the attachment.

Commission decision text; labels, links and ¶ are ours.

BackgroundThe appeals of Eugene Vick, Senior Correctional Police Officer, Northern State Prison, Department of Corrections, two removals, effective June 20, 2024, and March 31, 2025, respectively, on charges, were heard by Administrative Law Judge Leslie Z. Celentano (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on August 10, 2026. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

AnalysisHaving considered the record and the attached ALJ’s initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, including a thorough review of the exceptions, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on September 23, 2026, accepted and adopted the ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions and her recommendations to reverse one removal and modify one removal to a six-month suspension. The Commission also recommended that the appointing authority send the appellant to an appropriate anger management program.

Removal 1

The first removal involved charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee and other sufficient cause. In this regard, it was alleged that the appellant was charged with simple assault based on an altercation with his girlfriend.

Administrative Law JudgeIn her initial decision, the ALJ concluded that the underlying charges had been sustained, but that, based substantially on the appellant’s previously unblemished disciplinary history, that the removal should be modified to a six-month suspension.

Appointing authority's argumentIn its exceptions, the appointing authority argues that the ALJ erred in finding the appellant’s and his girlfriend’s testimony credible. It contends that his testimony was contradictory with his interviews, and her contemporaneous account of the events was more consistent with the video evidence than her testimony presented before the ALJ. It also argues that as a law enforcement officer, the appellant’s sustained misconduct was egregious and worthy of removal.

AnalysisRegarding credibility, the Commission agrees with the ALJ’s assessment. The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. See Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” See also, In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. Id. at 659 (citing Locurto, supra). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its de novo review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). In its de novo review, the Commission finds that the ALJ provided reasonable and supportable bases to credit the appellant’s and his girlfriend’s testimony at the hearing and sufficiently reconciled any inconsistencies. Her conclusions that that the appellant was initially on the defense during the altercation and that his girlfriend was “less than candid” in her report to the police are not persuasively undermined by the other credible evidence in the record or the appointing authority’s exceptions. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions based on those determinations were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

Similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission’s review of the penalty is de novo. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George v. North Princeton Developmental Center, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual’s disciplinary history. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question.” Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. See Carter v. Bordentown, 191 N.J. 474 (2007). Moreover, the Commission emphasizes that a Senior Correctional Police Officer, like a municipal Police Officer, is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966). See also, In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).

In this matter, given the evidence in the record and the context of the events, the Commission finds the appellant’s conduct, while clearly inappropriate, especially for a law enforcement officer, was not so egregious to warrant removal from employment absent an application of progressive discipline. In this matter, as indicated by the ALJ, the appellant had a long career without any disciplinary history. As such, the Commission cannot find that, given his long tenure and lack of a disciplinary history, removal is warranted. However, the Commission emphasizes that its modification of the penalty is in no way condoning the appellant’s misconduct. In this regard, the Commission’s concerns extend to the appellant’s violent response during the altercation. Accordingly, along with the six-month suspension, the Commission recommends that the appointing authority, upon his reinstatement, enroll the appellant in an appropriate anger management course. Finally, the Commission notes that the six-month suspension imposed, the most severe suspension permitted short of removal, should serve to impress upon the appellant the gravity of his actions as well as serve as a clear warning that any further inappropriate conduct may lead to removal from employment.

Removal 2

The second removal involved charges based on allegations that the appellant was untruthful during the internal affairs investigations. In this matter, the ALJ found that the underlying departmental charges should be dismissed as untimely under N.J.S.A. 30:4-3.11a (known as the “45-day Rule). Upon its de novo review, the Commission finds nothing in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and determinations in that regard were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or otherwise not based on the credible evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Commission affirms the reversal of the removal predicated on the charges relating to the alleged untruthfulness.

Remedies

Since Removal 1 has been modified and Removal 2 has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated to his position with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from six months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay until the date he is reinstated.

However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees for Removal 1. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in a disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995): In the Matter of Robert Dean (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). Thus, where, as here, a penalty is modified but charges are sustained and major discipline is imposed, counsel fees must be denied since the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

Further, since Removal 2 has been reversed, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 2-2.12, the appellant’s attorney is entitled to reasonable counsel fees only for such fees accrued pursuant to his defense of Removal 2.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning Removal 1 and the penalty imposed therein and the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning Removal 2. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. February 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision on Removal 1 will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved and on Removal 2 will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning counsel fees are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in Phillips, supra, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

Removal 1

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Civil Service Commission therefore modifies Removal 1 to a six-month suspension. The Commission also recommends that, upon his reinstatement, the appointing authority enroll the appellant in an appropriate anger management course.

Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from six months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is reinstated. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant’s reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Removal 2

The Civil Service Commission finds that the appointing authority’s action in removing the appellant was not justified. Therefore, the Commission reverses that action and upholds the appeal of Eugene Vick. The Commission further awards reasonable counsel fees as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12. However, as indicated above, this award is solely for counsel fees expended in defense of this action.

An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. The Commission directs that the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of counsel fees.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter should be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Rules cited in this decision

Statutes behind these rules

Sections of N.J.S.A. Title 11A this decision cites, and those the cited rules were adopted under.

Decisions this one cites

More cited decisions (8)

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